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This thesis analyzes the cost effectiveness of alternatives to the U.S. Navy's 
current hazardous materials management practices onboard its ships. Numerous 
recent laws regarding pollution prevention aboard ships as well as significant 
reductions in Department of Defense spending has led the Navy to seek initiatives to 
manage hazardous materials in a more efficient and cost effective manner. This thesis 
deals with reducing wastestream volume and costs and improving the management of 
the Hazardous Minimization Centers (HMC's). Research was conducted onboard 
seven U.S Navy Dock Landing Ships (LSD's): U~S ANCHORAGE, USS 
COMSTOCK, USS FORT FISHER, USS FORT MCHENRY, USS HARPER'S 
FERRY, USS MOUNT VERNON and USS RUSHMORE. Hazardous material 
wastestream data was gathered for each ship to determine the significant material 
contributors to disposal costs. Additionally, information was accumulated concerning 
the training received by HMC operators to identify potential management weaknesses. 
Research identified significant cost savings by replacing the currently used baled 
wiping rags with shop towels provided by a contracted commercial vendor. Also 
noted was the fact that HMC operators were not receiving the requisite training 
required to properly manage HMC's. Therefore, training alternatives are addresst-d 
to ensure competent management ofHMC's. 
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This thesis analyzes the hazardous materials management processes aboard United 
States Navy Dock Landing Ships (LSDs). Its purpose is to identify potential cost 
avoidance initiatives for certain items in the hazardous wastestream, and improve the 
competence of hazardous material managers by changing the Hazardous Minimization 
Center manning and associated training requirements. 
A. BACKGROUND 
1. Decentralized Hazardous Materials Management Afloat 
Up until 1994, hazardous materials aboard United States Navy ships were managed 
in a highly decentralized fashion. Each department, and often times divisions, maintained 
their own inventories of hazardous materials for day-to-day use. These items included: 
lubrication oils, greases and boiler water treating chemicals used by the engineering 
department; paints and thinners for ship preservation maintained by the deck department; 
and insecticides and x-ray developer used by the medical and dental departments. By 
maintaining these inventories, the departments incurred the responsibility for properly 
ordering, receiving, stowing and using hazardous materials, and disposing ofthe resulting 
hazardous wastes. Because many of the people responsible for properly handling these 
potentially dangerous materials were not trained and knowledgeable in their special 
requirements, there were many deficiencies in hazardous materials management. 
2. Environmental Concerns 
Secondly, the United States Navy was accustom to dumping almost any waste 
material into the ocean with the very few restrictions. This was the easiest and cheapest 
disposal method. However, with increasing public interest and resulting Congressional 
interest in preserving the environment, the Navy came under pressure to improve its 
disposal practices. In fact, Congress has mandated the elimination of all at sea waste 
disposal by December 31, 1998. Therefore, the Navy is faced with the challenge of 
developing technologies that will allow ships to meet the fast approaching deadline, without 
jeopardizing operational flexibility. 
3. Federal Funding 
Thirdly, competition for Federal funds is becoming keener everyday. With large 
spending increases for mandatory programs in recent years, and a national debt of nearly $5 
trillion, discretionary programs provide short-term solutions to a tight federal budget. 
United States defense spending has declined sharply over the past several years and deeper 
cuts into the discretionary "pot" are are likely in the future. Consequently, the U.S. Navy 
must creatively search for new opportunities to save money and be able to fully justify the 
funds they require. 
4. Summary 
We find ourselves in an era where two of the hottest subjects are environmental 
issues and federal spending. This places the U.S. Navy hazardous materials management 
programs under great scrutiny. Areas that require reform must be identified. This thesis 
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will specifically focus on the areas where cost avoidance and process improvements can 
enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the overall hazardous materials management 
program. 
B. OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH 
The recent adoption of a new hazardous materials management philosophy 
significantly improved the Navy's usage and disposal practices. The Consolidated 
Hazardous Reutilization and Inventory Management Program (CHRIMP) established 
centralized control and intensive inventory management of hazardous materials at all Navy 
commands. This has largely reduced the inefficiencies experienced under the decentralized 
environment. However, this is merely an initial step in a continuous effort of process 
improvement. 
The first area of study will focus on potential cost avoidance initiatives. Specifically, 
the research examines U.S. Navy ship wastestreams to determine major disposal cost 
producers and materials providing potential cost avoidance alternatives. Secondly, since 
Hazardous Minimization Centers (HMCs) and managers ofthose centers are the foundation 
ofCHRIMP, focus will shift to the shipboard HMC operators. Particular attention is paid 
to manning structure and the competence development of those HMC managers, since the 
CHRIMP objectives depend heavily on a well-trained core of personnel to properly manage 
and administer hazardous materials programs. 
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C. SCOPE OF THE RESEARCH 
There are numerous areas in the hazardous materials management process where 
alternative methods may provide cost avoidance or management improvement initiatives. 
This study takes a two-pronged approach. First, the end of the life cycle of hazardous 
materials (wastestream disposal) is analyzed to determine the most significant disposal cost 
producers. The research found baled wiping rags to compose a significant portion of 
disposal costs. Therefore, they are a likely candidate for cost avoidance initiatives. Second, 
a deficiency in the formal training of those responsibile for managing hazardous materials 
was identified. Therefore, research focused on initiatives for improving the manning 
structure and training requirements for HMCs. 
The wastestream data came from seven U.S. Navy Dock Landing Ships (LSDs) 
homeported at the San Diego Naval Station in 1995. These ships are: USS ANCHORAGE 
(LSD-36), USS COMSTOCK (LSD-45), USS FORT FISHER (LSD-40), USS FORT 
MCHENRY (LSD-43), USS HARPER'S FERRY (LSD-49), USS MOUNT VERNON 
(LSD-39) and USS RUSHMORE (LSD-47). Taking advantage ofthe commonalities of all 
U.S. Navy ship types and their life cycles allows the calculations and resulting models to be 
readily applied to other ship types. 
D. METHODOLOGY OF THE RESEARCH 
This study primarily utilized three methodologies to obtain the information and data 
required to develop the research conclusions. The three forms of methodology are: 
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observational, archival and opinion. 
1. Observational 
The initial phases of research relied heavily upon observing the various facets of the 
hazardous materials process. This included observing shipboard hazardous materials 
management practices, pier disposal procedures and the general operations of supporting 
shore activities; such as, Naval Station Environmental and the Fleet Industrial Supply 
Center (FISC) Hazardous Minimization department. Some ofthe weaknesses of this 
method are that people tend to act differently when observed by others outside of their 
immediate organization, which may distort normal activity. Additionally, observation only 
provides current data with no specific reference for what transpired in the past. This latter 
point makes the archival method, the next method discussed, a valuable asset. 
2. Archival 
The archival method was employed to collect the majority ofthe data. Obtaining 
wastestream disposal data from Naval Station Environmental personnel was crucial to 
identify overall quantities and costs of specific wastestream items. This data formed the 
basis for several models. Archival data was also vital in determining the number of students 
trained in hazardous materials management procedures and the associated costs over the 
past year. This method tends to produce the most unbiased information of the three 
methods employed, because the information is predominantly numerical. Numerical data 
tends to eliminate biases that are more apparent in written word or verbal interaction. The 
exception is when it is advantageous to misstate numerical data for internal or external 
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reporting reasons. This does not seem to be the case for the data obtained in this study. 
3. Opinion 
Lastly, opinions were obtained throughout the research process through interviews 
with the people involved in the hazardous materials process. This method contains the most 
potential for bias. To minimize this potential it is important to employ a standard line of 
questioning and interview a wide range of people with varying perspectives. This method 
was particularly helpful in identifying training deficiencies experienced by hazardous 
materials managers. This consistent finding focused additional attention to this particular 
area in this thesis. 
E. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
l. Chapter 1: Introduction 
Chapter I presents an overview of events leading up to this research and identifies 
the particular focus and scope ofthe study. It also specifies the research methodology and 
some of the limitations associated with those methods. 
2. Chapter ll: Environmental Legislation as an Impetus for Improving the 
Hazardous Materials Management Afloat Process 
Chapter II discusses the development of environmental concerns in the United 
States, particularly in the last few decades. In particular, the U.S. government enacted 
legislation, such as the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and Act to Prevent 
Pollution from Ships (APPS), to preserve the environment for future generations This 
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translated into increasingly more restrictive regulations for the U.S. Navy and the ultimate 
"zero discharge" mandate set for 1998. The Navy responded by establishing pollution 
prevention programs and research and development efforts to meet the deadline without 
disrupting normal ship operations. 
3. Chapter ill: Financial Reasons for Improving the Hazardous Materials 
Management Afloat Process 
Two particular aspects of the United States federal budget continue to significantly 
impact funding for the Department of Defense. First, federal spending for mandatory 
programs has increased steadily over the years. Second, the national debt is currently nearly 
$5 trillion, and also increasing. Consequently, Congress has targeted discretionary 
programs as an attractive funding source. In particular, the Department ofDefense budget, 
constituting the largest portion of the discretionary budget, has declined steadily since the 
mid-198o•s. The forecast is for more of the same, especially with the view of some that the 
United States military should be reduced after the conclusion of the Cold War. 
4. Chapter IV: Methodology and Data Presentation 
By collecting and assimilating various hazardous material related data for a specific 
class of U.S. Navy ships (LSDs), a couple of important research areas became obvious. For 
example, after accumulating wastestream disposal data for LSDs based in San Diego, 
California, is was obvious that wastestreams containing baled rag material constituted a 
signficant portion of disposal volume and costs. Therefore, models are developed in this 
chapter to determine the actual life cycle costs ofbaled rags. Additionally, deficiencies 
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were observed in the current system for managing Hazardous Minimization Centers 
(HMCs) aboard ships. The deficiencies eminate from the fact that HMC operators are not 
being trained to fulfill their jobs. Calculations are performed to estimate the costs of 
training HMC personnel. 
5. Chapter V: Analysis of Data 
Chapter V presents an alternative to baled rags, called the shop towel program. 
This program, obtained through a civilian contractor, provides a superior quality product at 
vastly reduced cost when compared to baled rags. Actual calculations are performed 
employing absorbency and volumetric equivalents to achieve a range of potential cost 
avoidance for both oil saturated and paint/solvent saturated rags. 
The second section of Chapter V exposes training deficiencies in HMC operators 
and the factors leading to those deficiencies. To solve the problem, personnel with the 
desire and the requisite capabilities to manage HMCs must be identified. Addtionally, these 
managers must receive the training required to perform their functions competently. 
6. Chapter VI: Conclusions and Recommendations 
The final chapter discusses potential methods for implementing the shop towel 
program, restructuring HMC manning and providing training for HMC operators. First, 
information about the cost savings and other advantages ofthe shop towel program must be 
communicated to shipboard personnel. Then, a policy is established to ensure 
comprehensive implementation. Second, to improve the effectiveness ofHMCs, 
appropriate personnel must be chosen as operators. This specifically requires people with 
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inventory management skills, who can realize career advancement opportunities through 
HMC employment. Therefore, a program for consolidating the HMC operation with the 
established storekeeper division on the ship is discussed. Lastly, the personnel chosen for 
HMC jobs must obtain formal hazardous materials training to provide the expertise required 
to properly manage the HMC operation and achieve the long-term goals of CHRIMP. Two 
alternatives are presented as avenues for achieving this training. 
9 
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II. ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION AS AN IMPETUS FOR IMPROVING 
THE HAZARDOUS MATERIALS MANAGEMENT AFLOAT PROCESS 
A. ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION BACKGROUND 
Up until the 19601s, there was virtually no legislation of any significance regarding 
environmental matters in the United States. The couple of laws that existed at that time, 
such as the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil (1954) and the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act, did not carry any real clout when it came to enforcement. As 
populations expanded, industries grew and the oceans became thoroughfares for 
commercial trade, naval ships and other vessels, there was a realization that environmental 
issues must be addressed. The usual method of disposing of garbage and hazardous 
materials at sea, without consideration for the environment, was rising at exponential rates 
with the increasing number of seagoing vessels. If actions were not taken, the 
consequences could be disasterous for marine life and ultimately the health and welfare of 
the world's human population. As will be seen in the following paragraphs, the path leading 
to the current environmental laws in the United States was an evolutionary process. It 
started with a basic policy that was eventually backed by enforceable legislation. 
B. NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT OF 1969 
l. Purpose 
In 1969, the groundwork was laid for a comprehensive environmental policy for the 
I I 
United States under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEP A) of 1969. NEP A was 
actually signed into law on January 1, 1970 (Public Law 91-190) with the following specific 
purposes: 
To declare a national policy which will encourage productive and enjoyable 
harmony between man and his environment; to promote efforts which will 
prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere and stimulate 
the health and welfare of man; to enrich the understanding of the ecological 
systems and natural resources important to the Nation; and to establish a 
Council on Environmental Quality [Ref 1 :p852]. 
The Congress, recognizing the potential impact of population growth, high-density 
urbanization, industrial expansion, resource exploitation and technological advances, knew 
it was time to act. Additionally, Congress began posturing itself to acquire financial 
resources to address environmental issues. 
2. Contents of the Law 
The actual contents ofNEPA were quite broad and basically began making people 
aware of the consequences of their actions with respect to the environment, and to show 
that the United States government took the issue seriously. Specifically, the law required all 
Federal agencies to: 
a) utilize available environmental technology in making any decisions that affect 
the environment; 
b) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation or 
other Federal action a full environmental impact statement; 
c) study and develop alternative uses of available resources; 
d) recognize the worldwide and long-range character of environmental 
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problems, and where appropriate and consistent with United States foreign policy, support 
and encourage international cooperation in solving problems; 
e) make available to states, counties, municipalities, institutions and individuals 
advice and information useful in restoring, maintaining and enhancing the quality of the 
environment [Ref 1 :p853]. 
Additonally, NEPA established the Council on Environmental Quality in the 
Executive Office of the President. This three member council, selected by the President, 
was tasked with providing an annual Environmental Quality Report to the President 
beginning with July I, 1970. The report was to include a status of the various 
environmental classes; such as, air, land, the forests and the sea and any particular 
environmental trends that were identified in these areas. It also reported on programs and 
activities in Federal agencies that impacted the environment, any deficiencies that were 
noted and courses of action to remedy the deficiencies. Lastly, the council was responsible 
for advising the President on all environmentally related issues [Ref I :p854]. 
In order to carry out this policy, appropriations of$300,000 for fiscal year 1970, 
$700,000 for fiscal year 1971 and $1,000,000 each year thereafter were established 
[Ref 1 :p856]. 
C. ACT TO PREVENT POLLUTION FROM SHIPS 
1. Purpose 
This act, signed into law on October 21, 1980 (Public Law 96-478), implemented 
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the MARPOL Protocol of 1978 relating to the International Convention for Prevention of 
Pollution from Ships. This treaty, which contained five annexes, was the first legitimate 
step in establishing regulations for shipboard discharges of various wastes, and enforcing 
those regulations. 
2. Contents of the Law 
The Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships is lengthy and delves heavily into setting 
regulations to significantly reduce, and in some cases eliminate, waste discharges from 
seagoing vessels. A couple of the more significant sections of the law deal with certification 
requirements and potential fines that could be levied on violators. 
All MARPOL ships (ships from countries signing the MARPOL Protocol treaty) 
were required to obtain MARPOL certification from their home country stating that the 
vessel was properly equipped and able to meet the requirements of the law. If a vessel 
failed to present certification upon arrival in another MARPOL country's waters, the host 
country was authorized to detain and inspect the uncertified vessel. Additionally, if a vessel 
was found to violate the discharge requirements imposed by the law, fines of up to $50,000, 
or imprisonment ofup to 5 years, or both could be levied [Ref.2:p2301]. 
The interesting aspect ofthis law is in its handling ofUnited States Navy ships. 
Naval ships fell under an exemption which stated: "This Act does not apply to a warship, 
naval auxiliary or other ship owned or operated by the United States when engaged in 
noncommercial service" [Ref.2:p2298]. In view of this, the Congress added a clause which 
stated: The heads of federal departments and agencies shall prescribe standards applicable 
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to ships excluded to have those ships comply with the MARPOL Protocol in circumstances 
where it will not impair operations or operational capabilities [Ref.2:p2298]. 
With the law being little more than an encouragement for the Navy to improve their 
discharge practices, ships basically maintained their usual way of doing business; no real 
enforcement was placed on them. However, this law was a sign that stiffer regulations 
would surely follow for warfighting ships and that environmental issues had now begun to 
make their way to the top of Congressional agendas. 
3. 1987 Ammendment 
On December 29, 1987, an additional step was taken to tighten envrionmental 
regulations in the United States. The Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships was ammended 
under Public Law 100-220. Specifically; Annexes I and II as they applied to navigable U.S. 
waters were expanded to include all ships, regardless of whether they were from a 
MARPOL complying country. Additionally, it allowed rewards to people providing 
information identifying violators of the law. These people would be entitled to a reward of 
up to one half of the fine imposed on the violator. One of the most significant requirements 
of the ammendment was that U.S. Navy ships were to fully comply with MARPOL Annex 
V. This annex totally banned plastics discharge in all waters and all solid waste discharges 
in the "Special Areas" designated in the MARPOL Protocol, within 5 years of the passing 
of the ammendment. The only exception after that time would be during a war or national 
emergency. Three years after the effective date ofthe ammendment, the heads of federal 
agencies were to make formal reports to Congress concerning their abilities to meet the 
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January I, 1993, deadline. Ifthe deadline could not be met, the reports were to include: 1) 
the technical and operational impediments that hampered compliance and 2) alternative 
schedules for compliance or 3) reasons why compliance would not be technologically 
feasible [Ref.3:pl46l]. 
Again additional appropriations were established to fulfill this law for fiscal years 
1988, 1989 and 1990 at a level of $3,000,000 each year [Ref.3 :pl469]. 
4. 1994 Ammendment 
As the 1993 deadline for Navy compliance approached, it was obvious that naval 
vessels were still deficient in meeting the objectives of the law. Realizing this fact, 
Congress once again ammended the Act with the Department ofDefense Authorization 
Act. This ammendment recognized the significant need for added attention to research and 
technology to provide solutions for the difficult disposal problems faced by Navy ships, 
without impairing their abilities to fulfill missions that required extended periods of ocean 
transit. It looked at current discharge practices and determined what areas could 
immediately be improved without costly upgrades to ships and imposed regulations in these 
areas. It took into account current technology and potential for advances over the next 
several years and created a timeline for future compliance requirements. The regulations of 
this ammendment as they currently relate to U.S. Navy ships are deliniated in Exhibit 1. 
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DISCHARGE REGULATION FOR U.S. NAVY SHIPS 
(Effective until31 December, 1998) 
Area Hazardous Materials Garbage (Non-Plastics} 
U.S. internal waters/ seas No discharge No discharge 
(0-3 nm) 
U.S. contiguous zone No discharge Pulped or comminuted 
(3-12 nm) garbage only 
12-25 nm No discharge Pulped or comminuted 
garbage only 
>25 nm No discharge Direct discharge permitted 
> 50 nm & high seas No discharge Direct discharge permitted 
MARPOL "special areas" No discharge Discharge food waste > 12 
nm. When necessary, 
discharge all other garbage 
> 25 nm. Report all non-
food discharges to CNO 
(N45) after operations 
Foreign countries No discharge Discharge food wast > 12 
nm from foreign coasts. 
Discharge all other garbage 
>25 nm. 
Comments None Garbage discharged should 
be processed to eliminate 
floating marine debris. 
Exhibit 1 
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DISCHARGE REGULATIONS FOR U.S. NAVY SHIPS (Continued) 
(Effective until 31 December, 1998) 
Area Garbage (Plastics) Garbage (Plastics) 
(NQn-FQQQ CQntaminat~d) (F oQd -Contaminated) 
U.S. internal waters/seas No discharge No discharge 
(0-3 nm) 
U.S. contiguous zone No discharge No discharge 
(3-25 nm) 
>25 nm No discharge No discharge 
> 50 nm & high seas Retain last 20 days before Retain last 3 days before 
return to port. return to port. 
MARPOL "special areas" Retain last 20 days before Retain last 3 days before 
return to port. Discharge if return to port. Dischargeif 
necessary> 50 nm. Report necessary > 50 nm. Report 
all discharges to CNO all discharges to CNO 
(N45) after operations (N45) after operations 
Foreign countries No discharge No discharge 
Comments Record-keeping Record-keeping 
requirements exist for at- requirements exist for at-
sea discharge. When sea discharge. When 
plastics processor installed: plastics processor installed: 
No discharge No discharge 
[Ref 4:p.l] 
Exhibit 1 (continued) 
There are four additional categories of wastes that are specifically designated for 
discharge restrictions in the OPNAVINST 5090.1B. They are: sewage, graywater, oily 
waste and medical wastes. Each ofthese categories are similarly controlled. The main 
point being that the Navy is significantly restricted in what they are able to dispose of at sea, 
with ultimate "zero-discharge" being the law in the near future. 
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D. CURRENT NAVY POLICY 
The Secretary ofthe Navy's top three priorities are: 
I) Ensuring the readiness of our operating forces 
2) Protecting and improving the quality of life of our people, and 
3) The modernization of our forces. 
Pollution prevention is forever tied to all three [Ref5:p2]. 
As stated by Robert B. Pirie, Jr., Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Installations and 
Environment) before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee for Defense on July 11, 
1995: 
We believe that our environmental program is an integral part of our central 
deterrence and war fighting mission, that it satisfies our legal obligations, 
and that it sustains our civic role to protect the Nation's future health and 
welfare. 
We recognize that restraints on our access to the oceans of the world or to 
shore based training areas due to a breach of environmental standards would 
have a profound, immediate, and serious impact on our military readiness. 
That is why we take the steps necessary to ensure that our operations on 
land, at sea, or in the air comply with all applicable environmental laws and 
why we promote environmental objectives in tandem with naval operations. 
We have also found that our environmental investments in compliance and 
pollution prevention programs can actually increase readiness by improving 
our maintenance processes. They can also improve quality-of-life in the 
workplace by reducing the exposure of our civilian and military members to 
hazardous material [Ref 6: pI]. 
With the enactment of over 40 environmental laws since 1970 that directly impact 
private industry and the Department of the Navy, putting off compliance is simply not an 
option. Failure to comply with environmental statutes and regulations can result in fines, 
penalties, criminal and civil suits, administrative proceedings, court orders, and cease and 
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desist orders against the Department of the Navy or some of our people [Ref.6:p2]. The 
laws are tightening to the point beyond just the Navy being held liable for environmental 
violations. Now its employees share the responsibility for compliance. The OPNAVINST 
5090.1B explicitly states: 
Most environmental statutes impose criminal liability for willful or knowing 
violations. Some statutes impose criminal liability for negligent violations. 
Service members may also be subject to trial by court-martial or to 
nonjudicial punishment for violation of environmental laws and regulations. 
Violations may also be prosecuted in State or Federal courts [Ref 7: p 1]. 
In short, environmental compliance is the law of the land and of the sea, and we 
must obey [Ref.6:p2]. 
E. NAVY'S INITIATIVES ENROUTE TO COMPLIANCE 
Faced with the need to fully comply with Federal regulations and statutes, the 
Department of the Navy had to seek innovative methods for using resources and disposing 
of waste materials. The task was especially challenging for aircraft carriers and other naval 
ships which must function as self-sustaining communities in the ocean environment. How 
do you send a fully operational ship and crew of anywhere from a few hundred to a few 
thousand out to sea for 90 days or more straight, and fully comply with Federal regulations, 
especially when they generate as much or more waste materials than a small to medium 
sized industrial plant? The following paragraphs present some of the initiatives the Navy 
designed, with the aid of numerous commercial vendors, to achieve compliance by process 
improvement of source selection of materials through final disposal. 
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1. Plastic Waste 
Plastic waste has been a particularly prominent issue because of its popularity in 
packaging all kinds of materials and its non-biodegradable nature. This presents a 
particularly long-term environmental hazard to marine life. In response to this, and in order 
to meet the December, 1998 deadline for zero plastic disposal at sea, two programs in 
particular demonstrate great promise for solving the problem. 
First of all, a plastic waste processor has been developed for use aboard naval ships. 
It was tested on a six month deployment on the aircraft carrier USS GEORGE 
WASHINGTON. The processor takes all kinds of plastic materials, including contaminated 
plastics, shreds and melts the plastic into compact, sanitized bricks that can be stored 
aboard the ship until port entry, where proper disposal or recycling takes place. In January, 
1995, the Navy Acquisition Review Board approved Milestone III, and the plastic waste 
processor has now entered the production and deployment phase in order to meet the 1998 
deadline [Ref.6:p7]. 
Secondly, the Plastics Reduction in the Marine Environment (PRIME) program was 
initiated as a result of the Pollution Prevention Act of 1990. This Act stated that: 
Pollution should be prevented or reduced at the source whenever feasible; 
pollution that cannot be prevented should be recycled in an environmentally 
safe manner whenever feasible; and disposal or other release into the 
environment should be employed only as a last resort and should be 
conducted in an environmentally safe manner [Ref.8:pl388-321]. 
The key to this law was to prevent pollution at the source, which is the idea behind 
PRIME. Since its inception, PRIME has been the driving force for reviewing some 516,000 
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line items in the Navy stock system to reduce or eliminate plastic packaging and introduce 
consumable items that are fully biodegradable. The Navy estimates that this screening will 
eliminate 500,000 pounds of plastic from the supply system annually [Ref.6:p8]. 
2. Other Pollutants 
Significant efforts have also been made to reduce other pollutants besides plastics. 
Some of the most impressive accomplishments have been achieved through creating 
alternative products for shipboard usage that are more environmentally "friendly1" providing 
more pollution prevention guidance, requiring pollution prevention programs to be 
established at all Navy activities, and outfitting ships with more technologically advanced 
equipment for retaining wastes and reducing legal discharge. 
First of all, the Navy has replaced such items as trichloroethane, methylene chloride 
and other solvents with more environmentally "friendly" substances. Additionally, they 
have suspended the use of lead and chromium-containing paints and are in the process of 
converting shipboard refrigeration and air-conditioning plants from using the ozone 
depleting gas CFC-12 to a much safer HFC-134a. In fact, the Shipboard Conversion 
Program is to be completed by 2001 when all CFC-12 plants will either be converted or 
retired. There are still many challenges in the area of ozone depleting substances, 
particularly in weapon systems; such as, jamming pods, radars, engines and aircraft fuel 
tanks; but the Environmental Protection Agency in cooperation with private chemical 
manufacturers are working diligently to find new alternatives. 
Secondly, the Navy has developed a Pollution Prevention Planning Guide as a 
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comprehensive reference to aid commands in establishing viable pollution prevention 
programs. As a result, all commands were required to develop an installation specific 
pollution prevention plan by December 31, 1995. Also, the Navy's Consolidated 
Hazardous Material Reuti1ization and Inventory Management Program (CHRIMP) has put 
structure into hazardous materials management by centralizing life cycle control and 
management of all hazardous materials and hazardous wastes under well-trained and 
knowledgeable individuals. 
Lastly, normal ship operations produce several unavoidable pollutants; such as, 
blackwater (sewage), greywater (wastewater from galley sinks and showers) and bilge 
water. To combat the problems posed by these pollutants, approximately 88 percent of 
Navy ships have been outfitted with oiVwater separators to treat bilge water to international 
standards and about 65 percent have oil content monitors to ensure bilge water discharges 
meet standards. All Navy ships have Collection, Holding and Transfer (CHT) systems 
which allow them to transit coastal waters legally without discharging sewage, and most 
have CHT systems that offer holding capabilities inport [Ref.6:p9-11]. 
F. SUMMARY 
There has been a realization in recent years that a concerted effort must be made to 
preserve the environment in a state that provides for the health and welfare of future 
generations. Taking the lead, the United States government established policies and many 
laws over the last few decades, such as NEP A and the Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships, 
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to cope with the ever-increasing problem of pollution. Consequently, the U.S. Navy has 
seen significantly tighter controls placed on their ability to dispose of wastes at sea, and 
further restrictions are on the near horizon. To comply with current legislation and enable 
their ships to meet future laws, the Navy has actively pursued research and development 
programs to reduce harmful pollutants. The efforts have focused on source reduction, 
pollution prevention guidance and outfitting ships with more technologically advanced 
equipment for retaining some wastes and treating others for legal discharge. 
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III. FINANCIAL REASONS FOR IMPROVING THE HAZARDOUS MATERIALS 
MANAGEMENT AFLOAT PROCESS 
Federal funding is another significant area that must be discussed to determine more 
clearly just where hazardous materials management programs fit in the larger scheme and 
what support they might expect to receive in the future. Pollution prevention and 
hazardous materials management are expensive propositions that have enjoyed recent public 
and Congressional attention as well as increased funding support. Despite recent successes, 
continued support in the future is very uncertain due the cyclical nature of the budget 
climate. 
A. FEDERAL FUNDING HISTORY 
To determine the financial climate the Department of Defense finds itself in today, it 
is helpful to examine the history of the Federal budget and some of the more powerful 
forces influencing DoD appropriations. 
1. Federal Spending History 
First of all, the size ofthe United States Federal budget has grown remarkably since 
its inception. In the early 1800's, the government spent a mere $11 million per year, but by 
1900 this figure climbed to $521 million. By 1944, Federal spending amounted to $91 
billion and today the figure is $1.6 trillion. Another way to look at this spending growth is 
in reference to the American economy by comparing it to Gross Domestic Product (GDP). 
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GDP is the total value ofU.S. goods and services computed on an annual basis. In the early 
1930's, Federal spending was 5 percent of GDP, but it doubled in the 1930's and continued 
its upward march to the 20 to 25 percent range that it has maintained over the past couple 
of decades [Ref.9:p3]. 
What are the reasons for this Federal spending explosion? The real exponential 
expansion has its roots back in the 1930's when President Franklin D. Roosevelt took action 
to "dig" America out of the Great Depression. Up until this point, the Federal Government 
ran on a relatively meager budget which was used simply to pay Federal employees, 
maintain a military and fund a few other governmentally sponsored activities. The main 
thrust ofPresident Roosevelt's "New Deal" was to greatly expand federally sponsored 
programs. Consequently, the federal budget doubled from $4 billion in 193 I to over $8 
billion in 193 6 [Ref. 9: p3]. 
Although the "New Deal" was generally accepted as a positive program in American 
history, it also established a precedence for expanded governmental spending to solve 
national problems. It began with the creation of the Social Security program to provide a 
more stable financial future for citizens as they departed the workforce; it progressed to the 
building of the nation's comprehensive interstate highway system and educational benefits 
for those returning from World War II; and eventually provided income assistance for 
poverty stricken Americans and health care for the ederly and poor by initiating the Welfare 
and Medicare/Medicaid programs, respectively. While these constitute the most significant 
federally funded programs, governmental infusion of resources to solve national and 
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international problems continues in agricultural subsidies, natural resources and parks, 
environmental issues, transportation systems, education, civilian safety and international aid 
[Ref IO:p3]. 
2. Discretionary vs. Mandatory Spending 
At this point, it is necessary to distinguish between the two prevalent spending terms 
used in the government. First of all, there is "discretionary spending," which is that portion 
of the budget that is left to Congresses' discretion to apportion in the best interests ofthe 
nation. This portion of the budget is composed of domestic, international affairs and 
defense spending; it currently accounts for approximately 35 percent oftotal Federal 
spending. The second term is "mandatory spending," which covers all programs that the 
government is obligated to fund each year unless the specific laws governing these 
programs are changed by Congress. Mandatory spending applies to net interest on the 
national debt, Medicare, Medicaid, Social Security and a broad spectrum of other much 
smaller programs. These programs account for the other 65 percent of governmental 
spending. 
It is important to make this distinction, because although federal spending as a 
whole has increased significantly, the discretionary and mandatory "pots" have not 
maintained their relative proportions over the years. Also, the individual programs that 
make up each of these portions have seen disproportionate changes. In 1962, which is the 
first year reliable data became available, discretionary spending constituted 70 percent of the 
total budget as compared to 35 percent today. The defense portion ofthis pot has seen 
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similar decreases. In 1962, defense spending accounted for nearly 50 percent of all 
government spending, but dropped-off sharply after the Vietnam War and continued to 
decline to the current figure of 18 percent of Federal spending. On the other hand, overall 
mandatory spending has risen exponentially over the past several decades. The following 
programs established in the 1930's and 1960's have experienced phenominal growth since 
inception and will continue to grow without legislative reform: Social Security (currently 22 
percent of total Federal spending), Medicare ( 1 0 percent), Medicaid ( 6 percent), Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) (1 percent) and net interest payments on the 
national debt which has better than doubled since the mid-1960's ( 15 percent) [Ref. 9:p7]. 
3. Consequence of Federal Funding Expansion 
The expansion of federal funding of numerous entitlement programs, large war 
expenditures, economic recessions that could not be planned for, and inadequate tax 
revenue to keep pace with expenditures, have all contributed to the inevitable consequence 
of a large national debt. Simply put, the government has spent more than it has received in 
revenues. In fact, only nine times since 1930 has the United States government experienced 
surpluses in revenues, and deficits have been the norm since 1969 [Ref. II :p2]. The net 
result has been the accumulation of what is now a $4.8 trillion national debt; this debt 
demands 15 percent of total government spending in interest payments. If the national debt 
grows more quickly than GDP, interest payments will account for an increasing share of 
GOP and may one day be the single largest portion ofthe Federal budget 
28 
B. RECENT LEGISLATION EFFECTING THE FEDERAL BUDGET 
With increasing public pressure over the years to have the government fund more 
programs and increase the support for currently operating ones, while maintaining the 
freedom ofthe country and taking aggressive actions to reduce the national debt, something 
had to change. Obviously the government does not have enough money to solve all of the 
country's problems nor could it continue to build an insurmountable debt which required an 
increasing share ofU.S. dollars for interest payments. Thus, Congress enacted several laws 
over the past two decades to deal with the situation. 
1. The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 
The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (Public Law 93-
344) established a framework for the Congressional budget process by requiring a 
Concurrent Budget Resolution to be passed prior to legislative consideration of spending or 
revenue bills. This provided a means for consolidating all ofthe issues that would play a 
role in the legislative decisions affecting appropriations. Additionally, it established budget 
committees and created the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). The CBO provides 
specific data and economic assumptions to assist Congress in making budget decisions 
[Ref.12:p.3]. 
2. The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 
The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (Public Law 99-
1 77), better known as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings (GRH) Act, was specifically aimed at 
addressing the growing national debt. This law established procedures for reducing the 
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budget deficit on an annual basis with an ultimate goal of achieving a "zero" deficit by 1991 . 
It primarily targeted budget authority and outlays to realize this goal, and established a 
sequestration process to reduce outlays ifthe President's budget did not meet the deficit 
target for a specific fiscal year. This Act was ammended in 1987 with GRH II (Public Law 
I 00-119) which reestablished the zero deficit goal for 1993 [Ref.l3 :p.C-2]. 
3. The Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 
The Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 (BEA), (Public Law 101 -508) revised GRH I 
and II. It did not target deficits, but rather limited government spending. Specifically, it set 
budget authority and outlay ceilings on three categories of discretionary spending: defense, 
domestic and international, for fiscal years 1991 through 1993, and a total discretionary· 
ceiling for all three, for fiscal years 1994 and 1995. The total discretionary ceilings were 
later extended by the Budget Reconciliation Act (BRA) of 1993 to include fiscal years 1996 
through 1998. Exhibit 2. 
30 
BEA AND BRA CEU.INGS 
(figures in billions of dollars) 
Fiscal Ye~r 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Defense 
Budget Authority 288.9 291.6 291.8 
Outlays 297.7 295.7 292.7 
Domestic 
Budget Authority 182.7 191.3 198.3 
Outlays 198.1 210.1 221.7 
International 
Budget Authority 20.1 20.5 21.4 
Outlays 18.6 19.1 19.6 
Total Discretiona~ 
Budget Authority 509.2 517.4 519.1 528.1 530.6 
Outlays 537.3 539.0 547.3 547.4 547.9 
[Ref.J3:p.C-3] 
Note: Beginning in fiscal year 1994, Congress could tap the defense budget to increase the 
domestic and international portions of the discretionary budget. 
Exhibit 2 
The BEA also established a mini-sequestration process to meet spending objectives 
vice the one-time sequestration utilized by GRH I and II. The specifics of this mini-
sequestration process are as follows: 
I) Discretionary mini-sequesters if any of the three discretionary categories 
exceeded their spending ceiling. 
2) "Pay-as-you-go" sequesters for mandatory spending categories, which meant 
an increase in a mandatory program must be offset by reductions in other mandatory 
programs or a provision for increasing revenue. 
3) General sequester if maximum deficit targets were not met. A critical aspect 
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of this being that if targets were not met, the sequester could make up the difference by 
taking 50 percent of the difference from the defense budget and the other 50 percent from 
domestic and international programs [Ref.l3:p.C-3]. 
C. CURRENT FUNDING CLIMATE FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
1. Forces Effecting the Defense Budget 
Several events in recent years have put the "spotlight" on the Department of 
Defense budget. First of all, the post Cold War period has significantly changed attitudes 
towards the U.S. military. The military expansion period witnessed in the 1980's under the 
Reagan and Bush administrations has completely reversed with no identifiable foreign 
threat, like the Soviet Union, challenging the United States' superiority. This change in 
attitude has contributed significantly to base closures, decommissioning ofU.S. Navy ships, 
reduction of Department of Defense personnel and a declining defense budget. 
Secondly, issues of fraud, waste and abuse have surfaced in recent years to raise 
public's attention to defense spending issues. This has been particularly evident in defense 
acquisition programs. For example, the Navy's A-12 Avenger II aircraft, the Army's 
Sergeant York division air defense (DIY AD) gun, and the Air Force's T-46 next generation 
trainer (NGT) aircraft were all cancelled due to schedule delays and cost overruns. In 
addition, the military was billed several hundred dollars for wrenches, toilet seats and ash 
trays by civilian contractors. The culmination of these events has led the public to spur 
Congress to increase their oversight of defense spending. 
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Thirdly, backed by public interest in increased defense oversight and Article I, 
Section 8 of the Constitution which bestows on the Congress the "power of the purse," the 
Congress has indeed tightened their hold on the budget process [Ref.l4:p.34]. Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy for Financial Management during the Reagan administration, Robert 
H. Conn, characterized the current congressional control of the defense budget as follows: 
(The Congress) has total and occasionally unconscionable control over every 
dollar we spend in the Navy, or for that matter, in any department of the 
federal government.. .. (The Congress) has attained a near-perfect state of 
anarchy .... There is a complete absence of discipline on the Hill .... This · 
contortion ofthe term "congressional oversight" has gone far enough. 
Unfortunately, the congressional appetite shows no sign of 
abating .... (Congress tends to) also worry about--or tinker with--the Defense 
Department's requests to buy forklifts, tractor-trailers, bomb fuses and 
practice bombs .... The problem is so severe and the degree of detail has 
become so oppressive that no one senator and no one representative can 
possibly know what is in each of the unwieldy pieces of legislation that he is 
called upon to approve or disapprove [Ref.l4 :p.41]. 
An additional reason Congress has shown increasing attention towards the defense 
budget is that it represents the largest portion of the discretionary spending pot. This makes 
it a tremendous target for satisfying constituent interests. By ensuring the passage of 
appropriations to support certain major defense acquisition programs that benefit a home 
state, or attempting to acquire funds from the defense budget to fund other interest group 
programs or mandatory programs, a Congressman can bolster constituent support for re-
election. 
2. Defense Funding in the Near Future 
The various forces affecting the Federal budget, and particularly the defense portion, 
logically lead one to expect declining budgets for the Department of Defense in the coming 
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years. This is even more evident when a history of discretionary outlays is studied. Most 
notably, discretionary spending as a percentage ofthe GDP was 13.4 percent in fiscal year 
1963. This percentage peaked in 1968 at 14.4 percent, but has declined steadily through 
today. In fact, the figure for fiscal year 1995 was 7. 7 percent and is expected to be 7.4 
percent in 1996. If current discretionary caps remain in place, the percentage will drop to 
6. 5 by fiscal year 2000 [Ref.15 :p.l ]. 
Another way to view the defense budget climate is to view authorization figures for 
the coming years. Since the military build-up in response to the Soviet Union threat in the 
1980's, at which time defense authorizations peaked at $302.5 billion in fiscal year 1986, 
defense budget authority has been on a steady decline. Exhibit 3 shows expected budget 
authority figures through fiscal year 2002. 
PREDICTED DEFENSE BUDGET AUTHORITY 
(fi2ures in billions of constant year dollars J 
Fiscal Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Defense Budget Authority 270 264 266 265 268 272 271 271 
[Ref 16:p4] 
Exhibit 3 
Although these figures show funding growth heading into fiscal year 2000, this is not real 
growth when compared to GDP. It still shows a significant real decline. 
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D. SUMMARY 
The United States has seen an almost exponential increase in government spending 
over the past several decades. In recent years, this spending has been predominantly in the 
mandatory portion of the budget to finance federally sponsored programs. At the same 
time, the defense budget has declined since its peak in the mid-1980's when the Soviet 
Union was the major foe. The problem is compounded by the fact that the United States 
government has accumulated a sizeable debt which is accruing enormous interest 
obligations. The forecast for the future is much the same, barring any legislative changes 
for mandatory programs. Therefore, the Department of Defense is certainly going to be 
faced with the ever-increasing challenge of"how to do more with less resources." 
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IV. METHODOLOGY AND DATA PRESENTATION 
The preceding chapters presented the facts regarding environmental and funding 
issues that have developed over the years, and predict the likelihood for further "belt-
tightening" in the future. With governmental spending increasing steadily over the years 
and the national debt on its way to $5 trillion, Congress will be forced to make difficult 
decisions to "cut comers" on spending. This is clearly evident in the inability of the 
government to reach an agreement for the 1996 budget, being already four months into the 
new fiscal year. One area that has provided a partial answer for lawmakers is cutting the 
defense budget. Robert Pirie states: 
Since 1991, our overall budget has been cut nearly one-fourth; we have 
decommissioned almost one-third of our ships; we are implementing three 
rounds of base closure and realignments; and the Secretary of the Defense 
has just announced recommendations for round four. Our environmental 
program, however, has more than doubled during this same period 
[Ref.6:p2]. 
It is obvious that in today's budget climate this trend of increased environmental 
spending at the expense of other defense programs cannot continue indefinitely, especially 
with the defense budget spiraling downward. Therefore, it is imperative that the Navy seek 
avenues to improve hazardous materials management practices with the current funding and 
technology base. By identifying better ways to manage hazardous materials and the 
resulting wastestreams, environmental preservation and significant cost avoidance can be 
realized today. 
The focus of this chapter, and the next, will be to identify areas where immediate 
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cost avoidance may be achieved by utilizing existing technology and improving the overall 
hazardous materials management afloat process. The first section identifies the largest 
contributors to hazardous material wastestream disposal costs. From this information, two 
sources, constituting over one third of the total disposal costs, are identified for further 
analysis; oil saturated and paint/solvent saturated rags. Actual "cradle-to-grave" costs for 
baled rags are then calculated for comparison to an alternative program that is discussed in 
Chapter V. 
The second section provides a historical perspective on the evolution oftoday's 
HMCs aboard ships. The transition from the Navy's traditional method of decentralized 
hazardous materials management to the current centralized HMC concept was 
accomplished using the CHRIMP philosophy. CHRIMP relies on a fully trained core of 
personnel to properly manage hazardous material inventories and administer the HMC 
functions. However, deficiencies are noted in HMC management practices that are 
attributable to a general lack of formal training. Calculations are performed to determine 
the total number of personnel who received training in 1995 and the estimated costs to 
provide the training. This information will be used in Chapter V as alternatives are sought 
to improve HMC management expertise. 
A. W ASTESTREAM GENERATION 
Sometimes it is beneficial to begin research at the end of the life-cycle of the system 
or process being researched. This seemed a logical choice in the case of hazardous 
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materials since the generated wastes pose a tremendous environmental concern. 
Consequently, their disposal tends to be extremely costly. The hypothesis is that by 
identifying the major wastestreams generated by U.S. Navy ships, one can trace back 
through the hazardous materials process (from disposal to ordering) to determine where 
costs can be avoided and to possibly reduce the overall wastestream. 
1. Background 
Before actual wastestream data is presented, it is helpful to understand the past 
disposal practices ofU.S. Navy ships. In the years leading up to the 1990's, ships enjoyed 
great autonomy in determining how they disposed of generated wastes. As seen in Chapter 
II, there was no legislation that restricted at sea dumping. Therefore, the incentive was for 
ships to dispose of hazardous wastes in the easiest and most cost effective manner. 
Disposal at a shore station required appropriately bagging and labeling hazardous materials, 
and potentially testing some items to determine their exact chemical composition. The ship 
incurred the cost for these actions, so the simplest method was to dump at sea. Wastes 
were accumulated in various spaces on the ship during inport periods and dumped during 
underway operations. U.S. Navy ships were driven by operational priorities with no real 
incentive for preserving the environment. 
Recently, the Navy's incentives have changed. The disposal restrictions outlined in 
Chapter II and the promise of further tightening of those laws, have introduced negative 
consequences for breeches of the statutes. Naval stations have also improved the disposal 
processes at the pier by providing a daily hazardous waste pick-up service, which is more 
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responsive to ships' dynamic schedules. This incentive shift has provided the initial 
groundwork for a change in the Navy's philosophy regarding the environment and its 
responsibility to preserve it. Now, the Navy must utilize existing technology to its fullest 
extent to meet current regulations and reduce avoidable costs associated with hazardous 
materials. For the longer-term, the Navy needs to develop technology that equips ships to 
meet the future standards. 
2. Methodology 
Several approaches were employed to research wastestream data and to ultimately 
identify specific items for potential cost avoidance analysis. First of all, hazardous material 
management personnel aboard Navy ships were interviewed to determine where to obtain 
wastestream data for U.S. Navy ships homeported at the San Diego Naval Station. It was 
determined that hazardous waste for all Navy ships is collected on a daily basis by the Naval 
Station Public Works Center (PWC) Hazardous Materials Collection Unit. Further 
interviews with Naval Station Environmental personnel indicated that PWC began 
producing monthly reports of hazardous waste generation and resulting disposal costs, by 
ship, in late 1994. These reports are now generated on a regular basis and sent to Naval 
Station Environmental for informational purposes. Since 1995 was the first complete year 
of reliable data, the cosolidated report for January to December, 1995 was obtained from 
Naval Station Environmental as an initial point for this research. The information provided 
by this data will be analyzed to identify the major cost producers in the wastestream and 
potential areas to target for cost avoidance. This data will later be used in Chapter V to 
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determine actual cost avoidance figures achieveable through an alternative program. 
3. Assumptions 
There are various assumptions that must be made when utilizing the PWC 
wastestream data. First of all, PWC personnel who pick up hazardous waste materials rely 
on shipboard personnel to properly label the materials that are bagged for disposal. PWC 
disposal personnel are trained and knowledgeable in hazardous material identification and 
are required to verify the materials at pick-up; however, the opportunity, although quite 
small, exists for misidentification. Secondly, hazardous materials picked-up are weighed-in 
each day which improves data reliability. But the people that weigh the materials 
sometimes use different classification names for the same waste materials. Thus, the 
monthly reports may contain more classifications than actual types of wastes disposed. 
However, this problem is resolved by combining like categories; such as, "debris paint" and 
"paint" to form one wastestream for calculation purposes. 
Finally, the scope ofthe study is confined to U.S. Navy Dock Landing Ships 
(LSDs). Specifically, all data collected will be for the seven LSDs that were based in San 
Diego, California during 1995. In using wastestream data for a specific ship type, in a 
specific geographical region, two further assumptions will be made: I) U.S. Navy ships 
have similar cyclical lives and, 2) Models created for one type ofNavy ship can be used to 
make similar calculations for other types of ships in other geographical locations. Both 
assumptions rely on the fact that each U.S. Navy ship follows the same general life cycle 
pattern, which generally consists of an overhaul/maintenance period, followed by "work-
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ups" and inspections, and culminates in a fully operational cycle. Additionally, ages of ships 
vary from newly commissioned to some with nearly thirty years of service. Since the data 
collected for this research is from seven LSDs, of different ages, in different stages of their 
life-cycles, applicability of the models and figures obtained to other U.S. Navy ships should 
be quite reliable and produce similar results. 
4. Data 
The data presented here represents consolidated annual figures for the major 
disposal cost producers of Amphibious Dock Landing Ships (LSDs) that were homeported 
in San Diego during 1995, as calculated from the PWC annual wastestream report. Exhibit 
4. 
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ANNUAL WASTESTREAMS FOR SAN DIEGO BASED LSD'S 
AND ASSOCIATED DISPOSAL COSTS INCURRED BY PWC 
(Calendar year 1995) 
Oil Rags PaintLSQlv~nt D~bris Qil Debris Paint OBA's 
Rags 
Anchorage 3,303 lbs 85 lbs 10,305 lbs 1,121 lbs 1,618 lbs 
(LSD-36) $5,594 $221 $8,583 $2,883 $4,207 
Comstock 10,394 lbs 674lbs 2,430 lbs 6,577lbs 214 lbs 
(LSD-45) $27,024 $1,752 $6,203 $16,974 $556 
Fort Fisher 2,577 lbs 1,074 lbs 7,231 lbs 2,656 lbs 89lbs 
(LSD-40) $4,688 $2,352 $8,068 $6,906 $229 
Fort McHeno: 4,575 lbs 444lbs 1,797lbs 5,811 lbs 477lbs 
(LSD-43) $11,841 $1,154 $2,920 $14,825 $1,202 
Harper's F em 7,209lbs 1,197 lbs 1,290 lbs 271 lbs 590 lbs 
(LSD-49) $16,870 $2,218 $2,751 $705 $1,409 
Mt. Vernon 4, 116lbs 347lbs 3,427 lbs 3,506 lbs 165 lbs 
(LSD-39) $10,395 $902 $7,877 $9, 116 $429 
Rushmore 11,552 lbs 1,491 lbs 740lbs 6,093 lbs 403 lbs 
(LSD-47) $19,825 $3,062 $1,277 $13,294 $1,048 
Totals 43,726lbs 5,312 Ibs 27,220 lbs 26,035 lbs 3,556 lbs 
$96,237 $11,661 $37,679 $64,703 $9,080 
Average per 6,247 lbs 759lbs 3,889lbs 3, 719 lbs 508 lbs 
ship $13,748 $1,666 $5,383 $9,243 $1,297 
Percentage of 
total '95 LSD 
wastestream 
Totals: 
153,778 lbs .284 .034 .177 .169 .023 
$304,935 .316 .038 .124 .212 .030 
Average 




One may note that wastestreams of individual ships vary, in some cases significantly. 
This is due to the fact that ships are in different stages of their life-cycles, as mentioned 
earlier, and are therefore likely to generate wastes in differing volumes. This strengthens 
the data by allowing the computation of good cross-sectional annual averages which 
smooth ship specific fluctuations. 
The above data readily shows the major disposal cost producers are oil saturated 
rags, paint and solvent saturated rags, debris oil and paint, and oxygen breathing apparatus 
(OBA) cannisters. These five catagories alone account for nearly seventy percent of the 
total annual wastestream for LSDs and seventy-two percent ofthe disposal costs. 
However, the oil saturated and paint/solvent saturated rag categories are specifically chosen 
for purposes of this study for the following reasons: 
1) Oil saturated and paint/solvent saturated rags constitute one third ofthe total 
wastestream costs. 
2) This study focuses on areas where cost avoidance can be achieved 
immediately without further technological advancements. There is no current cost effective 
technology available to recycle raw debris oil and paint wastes for reuse. Therefore, 
disposal is the only viable option. On the other hand, technology is being developed to 
eliminate the OBA wastestream. The new breathing apparatus in development will utilize 
rechargeable oxygen bottles instead of the chemical cannisters. This new technology is due 
in the fleet in the next couple ofyears. 
With oil and paint/solvent saturated rags targeted for further study, the following 
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subsections provide data for those components. 
a. Oil Saturated Rags 
Wiping rags are invaluable aboard ships and used by nearly every person 
onboard at one time or another. Engineers use them in the engine room and in the various 
machinery spaces throughout the ship in performing daily maintenance and to clean-up any 
spills that may occur. Deck department personnel use rags during their normal everyday 
tasks of maintaining and preserving mainly the exterior portions of the ship through painting 
and various preservation projects. Other personnel aboard ships use wiping rags in 
performing preventative maintenance (PMS) on equipment applicable to their individual 
operations and other daily tasks requiring the material for primarily clean-up purposes. 
With this in mind, it is not·difficult to see why oil saturated rags are the 
largest single contributor to the U.S. Navy ship wastestream and total disposal costs. 
Comprising twenty-eight percent of the total wastestream and thirty-one percent of the 
disposal costs, this category lends itself to further research. 
(1) Methodology. To accumulate data about the rags used by Navy 
ships, interviews were conducted with shipboard storekeepers. These interviews revealed 
that the wiping rags were acquired by individual divisions, on an as needed basis, by taking 
a requisition document to the Naval Station SERVMART. The SERVMART is a facility 
operated by the Fleet Industrial Supply Center (FISC) that maintains an inventory of high-
demand items for immediate issue to ships and other military installations in the area. FISC 
records show that the unit of issue for wiping rags is a 50 pound bale at a 1995 cost of 
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$20.43 per bale (Navy Stock Number: 7920-00-205-1711 ). These rags are currently 
acquired for the Navy through a General Services Administration (GSA) contract. Using 
this information and the wastestream data presented in Exhibit 4, a cost model can be 
created. 
(2) Assumptions. Before data is combined, some assumptions must 
be laid as groundwork for the cost model. First of all, the average weight for an oil 
saturated bale of rags must be determined to appropriately compare the saturated rag 
disposal figures presented in Exhibit 4. Tests were performed by saturating a halfbale of 
rags to determine the weight increase per bale. The weight increases due to saturation 
varied between fifty and seventy-five percent, depending primarily on two factors: 1) how 
fully each rag was saturated; 2) the various material make-ups of the wiping rags. The 
latter factor is particularly significant because the baled rags sold through the Navy Stock 
System contain a wide variety of materials (from silk to denim) ofvarious shapes and sizes. 
To compensate for the discrepencies, the standard issue size of a fifty pound bale was used 
as the base measurement, and a range of percent weight gains per bale (50 percent, 62.5 
percent and 75 percent) were calculated to provide a potential cost window for analysis. 
(3) Data. Exhibit 5 summarizes the absorbency assumptions for 
saturated baled rags and applies them to the Exhibit 4 wastestream data for oil saturated 
rags. A dry or unsaturated bale cost is then obtained and combined with the purchase price 
of stock system baled rags to achieve a total life cycle cost for baled rags. 
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BALED RAG STATISTICS (OIL) 
Type (A). Weight ofbale saturated to 75% (1.75 x 50 lbs I bale) 87.5 lbs 
Type (B). Weight ofbale saturated to 62.5% (1.625 x 50 Ibs I bale) 81.25 lbs 
Type (C). Weight ofbale saturated to 50% (1.50 x 50 lbs I bale) 75 lbs 
Number of unsaturated bales used to produce total LSD wastestream 
using type (A) bales: (43,726lbs oil saturated rags I 87.5 lbs) 500 bales 
Number of unsaturated bales used to produce total LSD wastestream 
using type (B) bales: (43,726lbs oil saturated rags I 81.25lbs) 538 bales 
Number of unsaturated bales used to produce total LSD wastestream 
using type (C)bales: (43,726 lbs oil saturated rags I 75 lbs) 583 bales 
Disposal cost per unsaturated bale using type (A): 
($96,237 I 500 bales) $192.47 
Disposal cost per unsaturated bale using type (B): 
($96,237 I 538 bales) $178.88 
Disposal cost per unsaturated bale using type (C): 
($96,237 I 583 bales) $165.07 
Purchase cost per bale $20.43 
Total purchase and disposal cost per bale using type (A): 
($192.47 + $20.43) $212.90 
Total purchase and disposal cost per bale using type (B): 
($178.88 + $20.43) $199.31 
Total purchase and disposal cost per bale using type (C): 
($165.07 + $20.43) $185.50 
Exhibit 5 
b. Paint/Solvent Saturated Rags 
The other wastestream category with the rag material component is 
paint/solvent saturated rags. This category accounts for 3.4 percent ofthe total disposal 
pounds and 3. 8 percent of the costs. Data analagous to that for oil saturated rags is 
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presented in Exhibit 6, utilizing the same methodology and assuming the same absorbency 
statistics. 
BALED RAG STATISTICS (PAINT/SOLVENT) 
Type (A). Weight ofbale saturated to 75% (1.75 x 50 lbs I bale) 87.5 lbs 
Type (B). Weight of bale saturated to 62.5% (1.625 x 50 lbs I bale) 81.25 lbs 
Type (C). Weight ofbale saturated to 50% (1.50 x 50 lbs I bale) 75 lbs 
Number of unsaturated bales used to produce total LSD wastestream 
using type (A) bales: (5,312 lbs paint/solvent saturated rags I 87.5 lbs) 61 bales 
Number of unsaturated bales used to produce total LSD wastestream 
using type (B) bales: (5,312 lbs paint/solvent saturated rags I 81.25 lbs) 65 bales 
Number of unsaturated bales used to produce total LSD wastestream 
using type (C)bales: (5,312 lbs paint/solvent saturated rags I 75 lbs) 71 bales 
Disposal cost per unsaturated bale using type (A): 
($11,661 I 61 bales) $191.16 
Disposal cost per unsaturated bale using type (B): 
($11 ,661 I 65 bales) $179.40 
Disposal cost per unsaturated bale using type (C): 
($11 ,661 I 71 bales) $164.24 
Purchase cost per bale $20.43 
Total purchase and disposal cost per bale using type (A): 
($191.16 + $20.43) $211.59 
Total purchase and disposal cost per bale using type (B): 
($179.40 + $20.43) $199.83 
Total purchase and disposal cost per bale using type (C): 
($164.24 + $20.43) $184.67 
Exhibit 6 
48 
B. HAZARDOUS MATERIALS MANAGEMENT 
The second area of study focuses on the people and processes for managing 
hazardous materials aboard U.S. Navy ships. 
1. Decentralized Hazardous Materials Management 
Until1994, hazardous materials aboard U.S. Navy ships were managed in a highly 
decentralized fashion. Each department, and often times each division, maintained their 
own day-to-day inventories of hazardous materials. These items included anything from 
insecticides held by the medical department, to lubrication oil and greases for engineering 
machinery, to paints and thinners held by the deck department for ship preservation. With 
each department responsible for ordering and storing their own hazardous materials, and for 
disposing of resulting hazardous wastes, many deficiencies in this method of management 
began to appear. 
First of all, proper hazardous materials stowage, handling and usage are critical to 
maintaining a safe environment aboard ships. With the decentralized system this was not 
always maintained. In many instances, unqualified personnel were responsible for handling 
hazardous materials. Often times junior personnel maintained hazardous material 
storerooms without any knowledge of compatibilities between items and the potential 
dangers posed. This fact could be validated by briefly looking at most hazardous material 
stroreooms on ships or INSUR V IIG inspection reports, which frequently cited significant 
deficiencies in hazardous materials stowage and handling. 
Secondly, although required by Navy regulations, hazardous material inventories 
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were rarely maintained. If inventories were kept, they were little more than a slip of paper 
taped to a flammable liquids locker with line-outs for issues and plus-ups for newly received 
material. All in all, the system lacked any form of quality inventory control which is 
particularly crucial for potentially dangerous items. 
Another factor, and certainly an outgrowth of insufficient inventory control, was 
that hazardous items were ordered in a largely random fashion. Generally, the person in 
charge of a hazardous materials storeroom asked the departmental supply petty officer to 
place an order after noticing that the inventory of a certain item was nearly or completely 
depleted. In other instances, hazardous material inventories were refilled using funds 
remaining at the end of the quarter. 
In any case, improper hazardous materials inventory control introduced 
inefficiencies into the system. In an environment where safety is paramount to crew health 
and welfare, poor hazardous materials management places sailors at a significant risk. With 
budgets being "squeezed" at every level in the military, it is critical to manage resources in 
the most efficient and cost effective manner. The costs associated with decentralized 
hazardous materials management were significant. 
With improper management, bad stowage practices were prevalent. Incompatible 
materials had a greater possibility of being stowed together. Mixing organic and inorganic 
acids or calcium hypocloride with oils or greases could produce catastrophic reactions 
including explosions, fires and noxious gases. In the confines of a ship, with its dense 
population of people, the potential impacts were significant. Another problem associated 
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with bad stowage practices was that personnel could not quickly and easily find the material 
desired. There were many ships where people had to literally climb over stacks of cans and 
other materials to find the item desired in a paint locker or hazardous material storeroom 
This wasted valuable time and unnecessarily exposed sailors to many potentially hazardous 
items. Lastly, improper stowage increased wear and tear on hazardous material containers, 
making labels unreadable and sometimes puncturing containers. This ultimately led to 
leakage and unidentifiable materials, which created an unsafe environment and introduced 
hefty clean-up and disposal costs.--Disposal costs for unidentifiable material run as much as 
four times normal disposal costs due to the requirement to perform tests to identifY the 
material before proper disposal. 
Secondly, poor materials handling by the issuers and users created additional safety 
hazards and increased associated costs. Often times people used hazardous materials 
without knowing their specific dangers and would therefore not take the precautions to 
wear appropriate protective clothing or properly ventilate a space where the material was 
used. Other times, when the user's the first choice was not easily located, they opted for 
what they considered substitutes to perform critical preventative maintenance on shipboard 
equipment and systems. In some cases, this led to premature equipment failure, or in the 
application of paints, premature flaking and peeling without any real benefit The costs 
were readily evident: degraded equipment with costly repairs and lost man-hours in 
performing preventative maintenance or painting. A final cost resulting from poor handling 
was incorrect disposal. With numerous untrained individuals using hazardous materials, 
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improper disposal was inevitable. Especially at the end of a workday, it was not uncommon 
to see hazardous material containers in pier dumpsters; at sea those containers were 
dumped over the side of the ship. These practices introduced the potential for severe 
violation charges, and, more importantly, negatively impacted the environment. 
Thirdly, the lack of inventory control introduced two other costs: 
1) Wasted man-hours and degraded equipment performance resulting from 
expired shelf-life materials being utilized for critical preventative maintenance jobs. 
2) Excess purchase and disposal costs for full containers of material that 
expired before they were ever opened (Total cost= Purchase cost+ Disposal cost, without 
any associated benefit). 
With inadequate inventory records, the shelf-lives of materials could not be 
monitored and appropriately updated. Some materials could have had their lives 
legitimately extended according to shelf-life guidelines, but they were disposed of 
prematurely. 
Lastly, and closely related to poor inventory control, was insufficient control over 
ordering. This led to the inefficient use of scarce operating target (OPT AR) dollars. By not 
having a legitimate inventory from which to order, and no demand or usage data, the 
ordering function was sporadic and extraordinarily inefficient. Not ordering the proper 
item, in the proper quantity, at the appropriate time, increased costs unnecessarily. 
Materials were stockpiled because some items, like common shipboard paints and 
engineering lubricants, were ordered almost every time a reorder was sent. This led to 
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excess carrying costs for materials that sat on the shelves for years, in some instances the 
life of the ship. 
2. Consolidation of Hazardous Materials Management 
Clearly, the decentralized processes for managing hazardous materials introduced 
numerous inefficiencies and unsafe practices. There were incidents of improper disposal 
violations cited by the Environmental Protection Agency and exorbitant base clean-up costs 
during the Base Realignment and Closure Act (BRAC) process. There were recurring 
hazardous materials stowage and handling violations noted on INSUR V and NA VOSH 
inspections and personnel injuries and shipboard fires related to hazardous materials. These 
all provided evidence that it was time for change. 
Since the original aim was to clean-up and properly organize hazardous material 
inventories and thereby create a safer environment for afloat units, a new system would be 
required to focus on inventory control and the management responsibilities. The philosopy 
that evolved would remove responsibility for ordering, storing, issuing and disposing of 
hazardous wastes from the ultimate shipboard users. The responsibility would be placed 
with a small, thoroughly trained core of people. This would free users from the burden of 
managing hazardous materials and allow them to perform their shipboard duties. At the 
same time, it would improve hazardous materials management through centralized control. 
The program that evolved was instituted on U.S. Navy ships beginning in late 1994. 
It is known as the Consolidated Hazardous Material Reutilization and Inventory Program 
(CHR.IMP). The basis for the CHRIMP was established by Commander Ed Payne, the 
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Commanding Officer of the Naval Air Weapons Station (NAWS), Point Mugu. To comply 
with the Navy Hazardous Material Control and Management (HMC&M) program, and 
meet California's stringent environmental regulations, Commander Payne decided to 
consolidate all the hazardous materials on the base under a single organization called the 
Hazardous Minimization Center (HAZMINCEN). This center provided more intensive 
inventory tracking and control to properly manage these materials. The Navy, sold by the 
program, refined it, developed inventory control software, called Hazardous Inventory 
Control System (HICS), and directed all U.S. Navy ships to implement CHRIMP 
[Ref 17:p.l]. 
a. Methodology 
To determine ifCHRIMP is improving the effectiveness ofHMC operations 
aboard LSDs, several interviews were conducted and three different ships were visited. 
This opinion and observational data helps determine how well the CHRIMP concept is 
being implemented and what areas may lend themselves to further improvement. The 
interviews indicated several commonalities among all of the LSDs. 
I) Shipboard HMCs are supervised by a petty officer storekeeper. 
2) Nearly all of the HMCs are operated by three people, including the 
supervisor. The only exception was the USS COMSTOCK, which recently returned from 
deployment. This ship had only one second class storekeeper running the operation during 
their post-deployment leave period. This number was to increase to two or three after the 
leave period when the ship became active again. 
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3) All of the ships man the HMCs on a rotational basis. Different 
departments on the ship send representatives for approximately six months. 
4) Few of the personnel operating the HMCs had received any formal 
hazardous materials training, and none had been to both of the courses currently offered and 
designed for HMC personnel. 
The latter two trends contradict the CHRIMP philosophy of managing 
hazardous materials using a well-trained core of personnel and intensified inventory control. 
Despite limited training, the observed HMCs performed well. They were certainly an 
improvement over the previous decentralized concept. However, most of the personnel 
operating the centers lacked specialized knowledge about hazardous item compatabilities, 
shelf-life programs, proper ordering and the various functions of the HICS program. All of 
these functions are crucial to safe, efficient and cost effective hazardous materials 
management and critical to CHRIMP's success. Therefore, research was performed to 
specifically focus on the management make-up and training. 
b. HMC Training Costs 
Two basic courses are currently offered through the Navy to prepare HMC 
personnel for their jobs on ships or at shore facilities. One is the Hazardous Materials 
Management course that covers all aspects of hazardous material handling, from ordering 
through disposal. It grants the graduating student a 9595 secondary Navy Enlisted Code 
(NEC). The other is the HICS/CHRIMP course, which provides thorough training on the 
lllCS computer program and its interface with hazardous materials. Actual costs for these 
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courses had not previously been computed, but an estimate can be established using the 
following conservative basic assumptions: 
1) Course costs per person are based on instructor salarys and student 
salarys for lost worktime away from their command. No course material costs are included 
because they are nominal, and no travel or perdiem costs are included since they vary 
greatly depending on the locale of the student's parent command relative to the training 
location. The latter of these costs are significant, and will be mentioned later. 
2) Two instructors currently teach the 9595 course (one lieutenant and 
one chief petty officer (E7) storekeeper). Since a person's time in paygrade effects their 
base pay, salaries are computed based on low to mid time in paygrade (6 years for the 
lieutenant and 12 years for the chief petty officer). The analysis assumes the instructor is 
single for determining the basic allowance for quarters (BAQ). This provides a 
significantly lower figure than the with dependent rates. The variable housing allowance 
(VHA) rate is for San Diego, where the training is conducted. 
3) A student's salary is also based on the most conservative figures. 
The only prerequisite for the course is that the student be a second class petty officer (ES) 
or above. Therefore, calculations are performed for a low to mid time in service ( 5 years) 
ESliving aboard a ship. Using the low end of the student paygrade spectrum, will give low 
estimates for course costs. 
c. Data 
Since a well-trained core of personnel are the heart of the CHRIMP program 
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it is helpful to establish estimates for the costs incurred in training personnel to fulfill their 
HMC duties. Annual figures are based on the average historical enrollment of thirty 
students per class for the 9595 course and twenty-four per class for HICS/CHRIMP. The 
costs for the 9595 Hazardous Materials Management course assume fourteen five day 
classes are given in San Diego. The HICS/CHRIMP course costs include twelve three day 
classes. These estimates are also based on historical data obtained from the course 
instructors. Finally, all salaries are based on 1995 figures. Exhibit 7. 
INSTRUCTOR AND STUDENT SALARIES 
Instructors Salary Student Salary 
1 - Lieutenant Base pay: $2,994.90 1- E5 Base pay: $1,348.50 
BAQ: 492.00 BAQ/BAS: 0.00 
BAS: 146.16 VHA: 0.00 
VHA: 288.64 CSP: 315.00 
Monthly: $3,921.7 0 Monthly: $1,663.50 
$3,921.70/30 days= $1,663.50/30 days= 
Daily: $ 130.72 Daily: $ 55.45 






Daily: $ 95.15 
Exhibit 7 
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With the information in Exhibit 7, the cost to train one second class petty 
officer in the 9595 NEC and total annual training costs is calculated. 
COST TO TRAIN ONE E5 FOR FIVE DAYS (9595 NEC): 
[Sdays($130.72 + $95.15) I 30 students]+ [5 days($55.45)] = $314.90 
TOTAL ANNUAL TRAINING COST: 
14 classes x 30 students x $314.90 = $132,258.00 
Similar calculations are made for the HICSICHRIMP course assuming that 
the course is instructed by a civilian contractor from the John J. McMullen Associates 
Company. The instructor is paid $15,000 for 120 days, divided between ship assist visits 
and course instruction. The daily rate is $125.00 ($15,000/120 days). The cost to train one 
second class petty officer in HICSICHRIMP, and the total annual training costs are 
estimated below: 
COST TO TRAIN ONE E5 FOR THREE DAYS (HICSICHRIMP): 
[3days($125.00) I 24 students]+ [3 days($55.45)] = $181.98 
TOTAL ANNUAL TRAINING COST: 
12 classes x 24 students x $181.98 = $52,410.24 
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V. ANALYSIS OF DATA 
The previous chapter identified the major categories contributing to the wastestream 
costs for U.S. Navy ships. Two related categories, oil saturated rags and paint/solvent 
saturated rags accounted for roughly one third of these wastestream costs. The wiping rags 
were thus identified as a significant driver in disposal costs and an area that could be 
researched for cost avoidance. Additonally, Chapter IV provided information on the 
development of shipboard HMCs and the costs associated with training personnel to 
operate them. 
The first section of this chapter will discuss a current commercial industry program 
that shows great promise as an alternative to Navy Stock System rags and the second 
section will address HMC management structure and training issues. 
A. THE "SHOP TOWEL" PROGRAM 
Since wiping rags are required for numerous daily functions aboard U.S. Navy ships, 
especially for maintenance and general clean-up in engineering spaces, they cannot simply 
be eliminated. However, saturated rags are a large contributor to ship wastestreams. The 
ultimate "cradle to grave" price tag per bale ofrags ranges from $185.50 to $212.90. Thus, 
alternatives were sought that may avoid some ofthe costs associated with rags. Since 
disposal costs are the largest component of the life cycle cost of rags, potential alternatives 
were sought in commercial industry to reduce the disposal portion ofbaled rag costs. One 
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interesting program is the "shop towel" program. 
1. Shop Towel Concept 
The shop towel program began several years ago to assist various commercial 
businesses in meeting the progressively more stringent U.S. environmental protection laws. 
Two years ago, the San Diego FISC recognized this program and established a shop towel 
contract for oil saturated rags with a local vendor: Prudential Overall Supply. This 
contract provided an alternative to San Diego area ships and shore facilities and is the only 
contract ofits kind currently available in the Navy. 
The following is a brief description of the shop towel program: 
I) A ship must obtain an annual contract with a commercial vendor offering the 
shop towel program. 
2) The contract specifies the annual price per shop towel used, and pick-up and 
delivery information. 
3) Once the contract is initiated, the vendor delivers a specified number of 
towels on a weekly basis to the ship. 
4) Each week, as new towels are delivered to the ship, the used towels from the 
past week are picked-up by the vendor who washes the towels at their plant site. 
This simplistic process continues throughout the contract year and eliminates the 
requirement for purchasing and disposing ofNavy Stock System baled rags. 
2. Shop Towel Costs 
How does the cost for shop towels compare with current Navy practices ofusing 
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baled rags? To answer this question, the following cost data (Exhibit 8) is compared with 
the cost data in Exhibit 5 presented in Chapter IV: 
SHOP TOWEL STATISTICS 
Absorbency comparison estimate: (1 00 shop towels = 1 bale of rags) 100 towels I bale 
Cost per shop towel (FY 95 contract price) $.035 
Disposal cost for shop towel customer $.000 
Total cost for 100 shoptowels: (100 towels x $.035) $3.50 
Exhibit 8 
The absorbency comparison estimate is based on FISC Hazardous Materials 
Management surveys ofU.S. Navy ships. The shop towels are a standard 18 inches x 18 
inches and made of 1 00 percent cotton, which guarantees consistent absorbency in each 
towel. Because of their outstanding absorbency properties relative to baled rags, far fewer 
shop towels are required to perform the same tasks. Shipboard personnel verify that many 
of the rags in a standard bale, including silk and polyester rags, possess very low absorbency 
properties. 
3. Potential Cost A voidance 
Compiling the purchase and disposal costs ofbaled rags and shop towels yields 
striking results. Depending on the absorbency measure used in total bale cost calculation, 
the shop towel program is between 53 and 61 times cheaper than rags. Exhibit 9 displays 
the potential cost avoidance figures. 
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COST A VOIDANCE ESTIMATES FOR (OIL SATURATED) 
SHOP TOWELS VS. BALED RAGS 
Baled Shop Cost Percent 
Rag Towel Avoidance Avoidance 
Shop Towel vs. Baled Rag Type (A) $212.90 $3.50 $209.40 98.36% 
Shop Towel vs. Baled Rag Type (B) $199.31 $3.50 $195.81 98.24% 
Shop Towel vs. Baled Rag Type (C) $185.50 $3.50 $182.00 98.11% 
Exhibit 9 
Referring back to Exhibit 5, total cost avoidance figures are calculated for the oil 
saturated rag wastestream for 1995, assuming shop towels were used, Exhibit 10. 
COST A VOIDANCE FOR 1995 USING SHOP TOWELS 
Baled Rag Type (A) Costs- Shop Towel Costs 
(500 bales x $212.90 per bale)- (500 bales x $3.50 shop towel equivalency) $104,700 
Baled Rag Type (B) Costs- Shop Towel Costs 
(538 bales x $199.31 per bale)- (538 bales x $3.50 shop towel equivalency) $105,346 
$106,106 
Exhibit 10 
4. The Shop Towel Program for Paint/Solvent Saturated Rags 
The previous analysis considered oil saturated rags. At this time, the Navy does not 
have a shop towel contract with commercial industry to cover paint and solvent saturated 
towels. There are two basic reasons for this: 
I) The shop towel program for oil saturated towels is being utilized by very few 
ships, thereby reducing the incentive to establish the program for paints and solvents. 
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2) The cost of the shop towels for paints and solvents are significantly higher. 
The towels are more difficult to wash and the wastestream resulting from the washing 
cannot be treated at the washing facility's plant. It must be transported for disposal. 
It is the second reason that receives attention in this section; the first will be discussed 
further in Chapter VI. 
The cost per shop towel currently in negotiations for paint and solvents is $.06 plus 
a 4.9 percent environmental fee. The $.06 covers towel costs, pick-up and delivery charges, 
and washing; the 4.9 percent is an allowance for disposal to meet environmental regulations. 
All totalled, the final cost per shop towel is $.063. Although this is 1.8 times greater than 
the $.035 per towel charge for oil saturated towels, savings displayed for the oil saturated 
towel contract are large enough to accomodate these higher costs and still yield substantial 
cost avoidance. Referring back to Exhibit 6, comparisons between baled rag and shop 
towel costs are made for 1995 to determine potential cost avoidance figures, Exhibits 11 
and 12. 
COST AVOIDANCE ESTIMATES FOR (PAINT/SOLVENT SATURATED) 
SHOP TOWELS VS. BALED RAGS 
Baled ShQI2 ~ Percent 
Rag ImYcl AvQidan~~ AvQidanc~ 
Shop Towel vs. Baled Rag Type (A) $211.59 $6.30 $205.29 97.02% 
Shop Towel vs. Baled Rag Type (B) $199.83 $6.30 $193.53 96.85% 
Shop Towel vs. Baled Rag Type (C) $184.67 $6.30 $178.37 96.59% 
Exhibit 11 
63 
COST A VOIDANCE FOR 1995 USING SHOP TOWELS 
Baled Rag Type (A) Costs- Shop Towel Costs 
(61 bales x $211.59 per bale)- (61 bales x $6.30 shop towel equivalency) $12,523 
Baled Rag Type (B) Costs - Shop Towel Costs 
(65 bales x $199.83 per bale)- (65 bales x $6.30 shop towel equivalency) $12,579 
Baled Rag Type (C)Costs- Shop Towel Costs 
(71 bales x $184.67 per bale)- (71 bales x $6.30 shop towel equivalency) $12,664 
Exhibit 12 
The data verifies that the total costs for baled rag purchase and disposal far exceed 
those incurred through the shop towel program for paint/solvent saturated shop towels. 
5. Volumetric Analysis 
To extend the analysis one step further, costs are compaired assuming that baled 
rags and shop towels have equal absorbencies. With equal absorbencies, the required 
volume of shop towels equals the current volume of a bale of rags. A bale of rags is 
approximately 24 inches x 24 inches x 24 inches, which is 13,824 cubic inches in volume. 
I 00 shop towels, on the other hand, are 18 inches x 18 inches x 4 inches, or l ,296 cubic 
inches. It takes 10.67 bundles of 100 shop towels to obtain the volume of one bale ofrags. 
This calculation allows us to compare costs for equal volumes of material. Utilizing the 
middle measures in Exhibits 9 through 12 and applying this concept (multiplying 10.67 
times the shop towel program cost figures), yields the results in Exhibits 13 and 14. 
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COST A VOIDANCE ESTIMATES FOR 
SHOP TOWELS VS. BALED RAGS 
Baled Shop Cost Percent 
Rag Towel AvQidance Avoidance 
Oil Saturated Estimate $199.31 $37.34 $161.97 81.27% 
Paint/Solvent Estimate $199.83 $67.22 $132.61 66.36% 
Exhibit 13 
COST A VOIDANCE FOR 1995 USING SHOP TOWELS 
Baled Rag Costs- Shop Towel Costs (Oil Saturated) 
(538 bales x $199.31 per bale)- (538 bales x $37.34 shop towel equivalency) $87,140 
Baled Rag Costs - Shop Towel Costs (Paint/Solvent Saturated) 
(65 bales x $199.83 per bale)- (65 bales x $67.22 shop towel equivalency) $8,620 
Exhibit 14 
Although research indicates that this is not the most accurate comparison, it does 
use a conservative absorbency assumption and still demonstrates sizeable cost avoidance 
under the shop towel program. 
B. HAZARDOUS MATERIALS MANAGEMENT TRAINING 
Chapter IV described the evolution of today' s Hazardous Minimization Centers 
aboard ships from the highly decentralized environment that once prevailed. CHRIMP and 
HMCs transfered the r~sponsibilities for proper hazardous materials and waste management 
from many untrained personnel to a few fully-trained individuals. Additionally, the costs 
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associated with preparing personnel for employment in HMCs, both ashore and afloat, were 
presented. For the west coast alone, a conservative annual figure of $184,668 was spent 
to train 420 people for the 9595 NBC and 288 people in HICS/CHRIMP. At first glance, 
this is encouraging in that many people are receiving the training. However, interviews 
with the five LSDs that were inport at the time of the research found that none of the 13 
people currently operating shipboard HMCs had received either of the courses. Why are 
the personnel currently operating HMCs aboard LSDs not receiving appropriate training? 
1. Reasons for Lack of Trained Personnel Aboard LSD's 
There are primarily two reasons why HMC billets are not being manned by fully 
trained personnel: 
1) Many of the course quotas are taken by shore commands. 
2) Training was obtained by one or more ofthe original operators of the 
HMCs, but their term in the HMC has ended (usually 6 months). 
The first argument is valid from two standpoints. First, there are more major shore 
facilities west of the Mississippi River (approximately 130 that may require some form of 
HMC), than ships homeported on the west coast (91). Therefore, purely from a numbers 
perspective, they require more course quotas to meet the demand for trained hazardous 
material managers. Secondly, from an operational standpoint, shore commands are in a 
better position to send people to training away from the workplace. Their watchbills are 
not as stringent and operational tempo not as intense. 
The latter argument reflects difficulties caused by the rotational pool from which 
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HMCs draw their manpower. Departments using significant quantities of hazardous 
materials are required to provide personnel, on a six month basis, to operate the HMC. 
Although this concept shares the burden of operating the HMC, it leads to significant 
problems. First of all, it strains already tight manpower resources in the providing 
departments. Secondly, the person assigned to the HMC loses valuable experience in their 
rating, which can adversely effect their promotion. The net effect is that the department 
does not want to provide a person for the HMC and the person that is ultimately assigned 
may not be motivated to properly perform the function. Thirdly, to minimize the amount of 
time away from the parent department, personnel are often not sent to the shooling required 
to make them an effective HMC member. Furthermore, the few people that receive one or 
both ofthe hazardous materials courses and fill HMC billets return to their divisions of 
origin after six months. Consequently, the direct benefits ofHMC training are short-lived. 
How can the Navy obtain well-trained personnel to operate shipboard HMCs? 
2. Establishing a Well-Trained Core 
Unfortunately, HMCs aboard ships have evolved as "burden-sharing" operations. 
They are manned by the divisions on a rotational basis. Divisions must stretch their 
manpower by contributing personnel to the rotational pool that operates the HMC. With 
people coming and going every six months, training is hard to schedule, corporate 
knowledge is lost after the short-term, and continuity in the organization is limited. All of 
these notions are contradictory to CHRIMP's objective: to properly control hazardous 
materials through comprehensive inventory management conducted by a well-trained core 
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of personnel. To create an efficient HMC, the core of personnel to operate it must be 
identified and fully trained. 
a. Identifying the Core 
It is crucial to identify personnel who are capable of properly managing 
HMCs. This task involves many factors. First of all, assignment to an HMC should not 
adversely effect a person's promotablity. Secondly, a person should be assigned for a 
period of not less than two years to develop corporate knowledge and expertise which 
provides program stability and better continuity. Thirdly, it should not negatively impact 
the daily functioning of the various departments aboard the ship. Lastly, identifying 
personnel with experience in hazardous materials or inventory management would help 
build a strong program. 
b. Training the Core 
Another significant factor is ensuring HMC personnel are trained to perform 
their duties. Chapter IV estimated that the total cost to train one person in both the 9595 
NEC and HICS/CHRIMP was $496.88 ($314.90 for the 9595 NEC and $181.98 for 
HICS/CHRIMP). Based on this information, the total average annual cost to fully train a 
ship's HMC personnel under the current manning structure is: 
ONE PETTY OFFICER SK SUPERVISOR (I YEAR AVG. ASSIGNMENT): 
Annual training cost: $314.90 + $181.98 = $496.88 
TWO ROTATIONAL PERSONNEL (6 MONTH AVG. ASSIGNMENT): 
Annual training cost: 4 x ($314.90 + $181.98) = $1,987.52 
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TOTAL ANNUAL TRAINING COST FOR ONE LSD: $2,484.40 
These figures are even more significant when viewed from a "return on investment" 
perspective. Viewed in this manner, one storekeeper produces one year's worth of work in 
the HMC for a $496.88 investment; one rotational person produces one haifa year's work 
for the same investment. This cycle is perpetuated through the rotational pool concept. 
Therefore, increasing the length of service in the HMC will pay dividends in the form of 
return on the training investment. 
3. Conclusion 
It is apparent from data collected, that further change is required for hazardous 
materials management aboard ships. The rotational pool concept for staffing HMCs was an 
acceptable interim plan during CHRIMP initiation and while establishing HMCs. But, it has 
shown weaknesses as a viable long-term program. The disincentives to the rotational pool 
personnel and their parent departments are great, which tends to offset the improvements 
achieved by forming HMCs. Additionally, training, which is crucial for the proper 
management of hazardous materials, is often neglected, and when it is received does not 
produce long-term benefits. All of this points to the need for a structural change in HMCs 
that will achieve CHR.IMP' s goals to provide a well-trained core of personnel to manage 
hazardous materials, thereby freeing the ultimate users ofthe burden. Chapter VI will offer 
alternatives to the current HMC manning and training policies that may lead to more 
efficient and cost effective operations for the long-run. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This study focused on the evolutionary processes that helped form the hazardous 
materials management environment on today's U.S. Navy ships. The United States 
government noticed the environmental impact of many ofthe country's practices and 
determined that society would face health and welfare consequences in the future unless 
policies were immediately enacted to prevent pollution. Therefore, legislation, including the 
National Environmental Policy Act and the Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships, was passed 
to display the government's concern for the environment and invoke the public's attention. 
Federal spending is a second area that continues to influence the Department of 
Defense and, consequently, the U.S. Navy. The nearly exponential growth offederal 
spending, predominantly for nondiscretionary programs, has been partially offset by a 
continual decline in defense spending since the mid-1980's. This, coupled with the reality of 
an increasing national debt, points to increasingly more difficult budget decisions in the 
future and fewer available dollars for the military. 
The above mentioned government trends have significantly impacted the hazardous 
materials management procedures aboard U.S. Navy ships. First, recent legislation has 
changed the ships' alternatives for hazardous materials disposal. In the past, the simplest 
and cheapest method for disposing hazardous materials was to dump them at sea during 
normal operations. With legislative restrictions for at-sea disposal, associated fines and 
punishment, and better naval station disposal support, the Navy has an incentive to be a 
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"partner" in environmental protection practices. Additionally, the Navy found its hazardous 
materials management process to be inadequate. The current practice involved 
decentralized hazardous materials management by numerous untrained personnel. These 
personnel were responsible for ordering, stowing, issuing and disposing of all hazardous 
materials. This led to several inefficiencies and unsafe practices. Consequently, the Navy 
adopted the Consolidated Hazardous Material Reutilization and Inventory Program 
(CHRIMP). This program consolidated all of a ship's hazardous materials into one 
Hazardous Minimization Center (HMC). This HMC is operated by a core of well-trained 
individuals responsible for the central control of all hazardous materials for the 
organization. 
Significant improvements have been made in hazardous materials management in 
recent years, but there many challenges still ahead. Tighter at-sea dumping restrictions are 
eminent as the twenty-first century approaches. This has received the focus of many 
research and development efforts. On the other hand, there are areas of hazardous 
materials management where immediate cost avoidance and improvements can be achieved 
without additonal funding or scientific research. That is the focus of this research. 
Specifically, two areas at the extremes ofthe hazardous materials management 
process spectrum were identified for improvements; baled wiping rags (disposal portion of 
the process), and the management structure ofHMCs (where hazardous materials 
management decisions are initiated). Baled rags account for nearly one third ofthe 
hazardous material wastestream from U.S. Navy ships. They were found to be sixty-five 
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times more expensive than an alternative shop towel program provided through commercial 
sources. Research also noted that training for HMC operators, which is crucial to 
administrating CHRIMP, was not received by a majority ofmanagers aboard ships. This 
allowed inefficiencies to slip into the operations and caused a general lack of continuity. 
This chapter will specifically address these two areas and how programs may be successfully 
implemented to improve the overall efficiency and cost effectiveness of the hazardous 
materials management process. 
A. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SHOP TOWEL PROGRAM 
l. Reasons for Ships not Implementing the Shop Towel Program 
Currently, there are only four ships at the San Diego Naval Station that utilize the 
shop towel program. The basic reasons for the lack of interest are listed below: 
1) Many ships are simply not aware of the program, as determined through 
interviews conducted on the various LSDs. 
2) To those who are aware of the program, the shop towel is considered as just 
another contract that must be established and monitored; therefore it is not worth the 
additional effort. 
3) Shipboard users have historically used baled wiping rags provided through 
the Navy stock system and are reluctant to change their method of doing business. 
4) Personnel are not aware of the cost avoidance achievable through the shop 
towel program. 
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5) Ships do not pay their hazardous material disposal costs and nobody 
monitors or questions unusually large disposal costs. 
6) The shop towel program is not currently available overseas, so ships are 
concerned about the transition from shop towels, when homeported in the United States. to 
baled rags, when deployed. It is easier to maintain one program. 
All of these reasons represent the incentives for ships not to participate in the shop 
towel program. Therefore, it is critical to educate shipboard personnel on the savings 
available through shop towels, and change the incentive structure so that it is in the ships' 
best interests to enter the program. 
2. Method for Implementation 
To successfully implement the shop towel program, it must address the six items 
identified above. First of all, shipboard personnel must know about the program. The crew 
must understand the program's significance to provide incentive for the change; and the 
people capable of implementing the program, the commanding officer and supply officer, 
must buy into the program. Although the FISC Hazardous Waste Management department 
has produced new letters delineating the advantages of the program, few people read the 
articles. Consequently, something more comprehensive is required, that reaches the 
intended audience. 
Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) directives are often interpreted negatively. They 
frequently restrict the flexibility of personnel and operating units, and may require additional 
reporting and other administrative burdens. However, in the case of the shop towel 
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program, the savings are significant. Additionally, the administrative burdens are relatively 
insignificant and actually place control of disposal costs with the appropriate source. 
Therefore, a CNO directive should be sent, in message format, to all afloat commands 
addressing the following topics: 
a. Explanation of Shop Towel Program and General Advantages 
First of all, shipboard personnel must be informed about the shop towel 
program and how it operates. Secondly, users need to understand that it includes a ''user 
friendly" pick-up and delivery cycle. This relieves shipboard personnel of bagging and 
labeling baled rags for disposal, and eliminates the time required for personnel to purchase 
baled rags at SERVMART. Finally, users should know that a contract is already 
established for oil-saturated shop towels with a local vendor. The only document required 
from a ship is an naval supply document II49 (purchase request). This document, including 
an estimate of shop towels required for the year and the resulting dollar cost based on the 
current shop towel contract price, can be delivered to the FISC purchasing agent in charge 
of the contract. This agent will consummate the contract. 
To address apprehensions of changing from baled rags, the following 
advantages of shop towels over baled rags should be advertised: 
I) Shop towels are a standard I8 inch x I8 inch size and made of I 00 
percent cotton, which ensures consistent absorbency properties. Baled rags contain various 
fabric make-ups and sizes. 
2) The customer does not have to worry about stock outages, as can 
75 
occur with baled rags at the FISC SERVMART. 
3) Lastly, shop towels require far less space for storage. A bale of rags 
requires 13,824 cubic inches of space; shop towels with equivalent absorbency properties 
only require 1,296 cubic inches (10.67 times less space). 
Communicating these points would address the first three reasons described earlier for not 
implementing the shop towel program. Cost issues should also be discussed to inform 
people about current disposal costs and potential savings achievable through the shop 
towel program. 
b. Disposal Costs and Potential Program Savings 
Probably the most significant reasons why more ships are not utilizing the 
shop towel program is that they are not aware of the quantity ofbaled rags they purchase, 
the resulting disposal costs they incur, and the savings that can be realized through the shop 
towel program. 
First of all, as stated earlier, each department on the ship is responsible for 
acquiring their own baled rags through SERVMART. This purchase is not recorded on the 
normal stock records in the SNAP II computer inventory system maintained by the ship's 
storekeepers. Consequently, no historical data is readily available to determine actual 
demands for baled rags. Therefore, the money spent for baled rag purchases is invisible. 
More importantly, ships are not responsible for paying their own hazardous material 
disposal costs. Costs are incurred by the PWC disposal unit and paid by the type 
commander (Commander, Naval Surface Force). Nobody questions unusually large 
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disposal costs for specific ships. Until PWC's monthly reports were recently initiated, 
individual ship wastestreams were not tracked. With someone else paying the bill, 
hazardous waste disposal costs are transparent to ships, which relieves them of any 
incentive for reducing these costs. To make shipboard personnel aware of disposal costs, a 
brief summary of current disposal costs and potential savings through the shop towel 
program could be provided. 
Utilizing the medium cost avoidance figures for oil saturated and 
paint/solvent saturated shop towels in Exhibits 9 and 11 respectively, and the percentages 
calculated for volumetric comparisons in Exhibit 13, a range of total cost savings can be 
estimated for U.S. Navy ships homeported in the continental United States. First, take the 
wastestream disposal cost per ship for oil saturated rags and paint/solvent saturated rags 
determined in Exhibits 4 and 6, respectively. To these figures add the initial purchase price 
of the bales of rags used. Cost avoidance percentage figures are then applied and the result 
multiplied by 210, which represents the number ofU.S. Navy ships homeported in the 
continental United States. The final figures are the expected annual savings for the shop 
towel program using absorbency and volumetric comparisons Exhibit 15. 
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ESTIMATED TOTAL ANNUAL COST A VOIDANCE ACHIEVABLE 
THROUGHTHESHOPTOWELPROGRAM 
Per ship Initial purchase Cost avoidance CQst avoidanc~ Total annyal 
dispQ~al QQst Qfbaled rag~ p~rQentag~ per ship ~ 
Exhibit 4 Exhibits 9,11,14 aYQidanQ~ 
[$13,748 + (77 X $20.43)] X .9824 = $15,051 
[ $1,666 + ( 9 X $20.43)) X .9685 = $1,792 
Total = $16,843 X 210= $3,537,030 
[$13,748 + (77 X $20.43)) X .8127 = $12,451 
[ $1,666 + ( 9 X $20.43)] X .. 6636 = $1,228 
Total = $13,679 X 210= $2,872,590 
Exhibit 15 
The 210 U.S. Navy ships vary in size, which ultimately influences their 
hazardous material wastestream quantities per ship. However, LSDs are median sized 
ships, with frigates and aircraft carriers being the small and large ship extremes. Therefore, 
the cost avoidance figures based on LSD data should provide a reasonable estimate. 
Additionally, taking the average of the total values in Exhibit 15, ($3.2 million), provides a 
conservative estimate since the volumetric figures tend to understate the avoidance figures. 
c. CNO Shop Towel Policy 
With the audience aware of the shop towel program and the significant 
potential savings, the actual policy can be delineated. 
POLICY: 
In view of the sizeable savings of the shop towel program over baled rags, 
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all U.S. Navy ships homeported in the continental United States will be required to adopt 
the shop towel contract within one year. The only exception will be for ships due to deploy 
within the one year window where, because of the short term nature of the contract, 
establishing the shop towel program would be infeasible. Commanding officers of each ship 
will be responsible for authorizing the exemption, but should make the final determination 
using sound fiscal judgement. 
After the initial one year deadline, all ships will be required to obtain the 
shop towel contract for a period of not later than 30 days after returning from deployment 
to 30 days prior to departing for deployment. The initial one year window will allow ships 
to use accumulated stocks of baled rags, determine usage data for shop towel contract 
initiation and establish the contract. The 30 day window before and after deployment will 
allow time to reestablish of contracts upon arrival stateside, and terminate contracts and 
make final vendor payments prior to departure. 
Additionally, the responsibility for hazardous material disposal costs will be 
placed in the hands of those individual commands that generate the wastes. Therefore, 
beginning next fiscal year, individual ships will be alloted their portion of the type 
commander budget for hazardous material disposal costs. Ships will receive a monthly 
billing from PWC delineating the various wastestreams and disposal costs incurred. By 
performing business in this manner, costs are made visible to the people who are able to 
control them. 
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d Future Plans for Shop Towel Expansion and Improvement 
The one area that still must be addressed is the idea of using shop towels 
overseas. Currently, the shop towel program is not available to U.S. Naval ships deployed 
in foreign countries. However, Prudential Overall Supply, the company that currently holds 
the San Diego shop towel contract, has a plant in Singapore. As the shop towel program 
gains popularity throughout the U.S Navy, additional overseas expansion is probable. 
Until expansion occurs, there is an alternative that could reduce costs in the 
interim. The alternative would require ships to purchase a sufficient number of shop towels 
to last an entire deployment prior to departing the United States; the towels could be 
disposed in foreign ports as they become contaminated. This is similar to the current 
practice utilizing baled rags, with two significant differences: 1) The purchase price of 
baled rags ($20.43) is 5.8 times more than an absorbency equivalent 100 shop towels 
($3.50), and 2) a bale of rags occupies 10.67 times more space than 100 shop towels. 
The first difference allows a significant purchase price savings by using shop 
towels. How.ever, the cost would not be 5.8 times less because current shop towel contract 
prices are based on reusing shop towels after washing. To achieve purchase price savings, 
the Navy must negotiate a per towel cost ofless than $.20 for overseas disposal purposes. 
The second difference shows great potential volumetric advantages. First, 
the average 77 oil saturated bales plus 9 paint/solvent saturated bales used by a ship per 
year (determined in Chapter IV) is divided by two. This represents anticipated usage for a 
standard six month deployment ( 43 bales). This total is then multiplied by the volumetric 
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measure of 13,824 cubic inches to determine storage requirements for six months (594,432 
cubic inches or 344 cubic feet). This is compared to 4,300 shop towels, which require 
1,296 cubic inches per one hundred, for a total of55,728 cubic inches or 32.2 cubic feet. It 
is evident from this comparison, that stocking baled rags for a full six month deployment is 
not feasible because of space requirements; whereas, a six month stocking of shop towels is. 
This concept is even more significant when viewed from a supply source perspective. If all 
U.S. Navy ships utilize shop towels on a full-time basis, baled rags could be eliminated from 
the stock system. This would considerably increase available space in SERVMARTs, 
FISCs, and supply support ships (AFSs) allowing for the stocking of other high priority 
materials. This ultimately will increase overall fleet readiness. 
B. RESTRUCTURING HAZARDOUS MATERIALS MANAGEMENT 
1. Initial Phases of CHRIMP Implementation 
When CHRIMP was implemented aboard U.S. Navy ships, the aim was to establish 
the program as quickly as possible, while minimizing the impact on daily operations of the 
ships' various departments. Since hazardous materials are used by all departments on a 
ship, the rotational pool concept was chosen, where each department takes turns providing 
personnel to operate the HMC. This concept allowed the HMC's additional administrative 
burden to be spread among all departments, rather than requiring one department to 
shoulder the entire responsibility. It also better informed shipboard personnel about 
properly managing hazardous materials and of the environmental impact of improper 
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practices. Finally, it improved the efficiency and effectiveness of the initial hazardous 
materials consolidation effort. The consolidation required all hazardous materials onboard 
the ship to be integrated in HMC spaces. The HMC operators then determined which 
materials to keep. Those that were in good condition but in excess of the ship's needs 
were turned-in to the shore facility for re-use; materials with an expired shelf-life or that 
were unusable for other reasons were disposed. By having everybody represented in the 
HMC process, departments were more willing to turn-in hazardous materials from their 
spaces. 
All of the positive aspects of the rotational pool concept were important in initially 
implementing CHRIMP. But as the program matured, numerous problems surfaced which 
challenge its long-term viability. The reality is that a more permanent, continuous program 
is needed to fully achieve CHRIMP' s goals for the years to come. 
2. Structural Change 
As noted in Chapter V, a major shortcoming oftoday's shipboard HMCs is that the 
personnel who operate them do not receive the comprehensive training they require. The 
most significant reason for this is the rotational pool. Since the average term of rotational 
personnel is six months, people transfer in and out ofHMCs on a regular basis. This 
inhibits developing strong technical expertise and program continuity. Additiomtlly, 
department heads and division officers, in keeping with their interest in maintaining the 
manpower base in their specific departments, aggressively attempt to minimize their 
persnonnels' tenures in the HMC. This ultimately sacrifices formal hazardous materials 
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schools, and places heavier reliance upon "on-the-job" training (OJT). 
Sacrificing formal training in favor ofOJT reduces the HMC's effectiveness in three 
ways: 
1) Time and the resulting productivity must be sacrificed from normal HMC 
operations to conduct orr. 
2) Because of the requirement to maintain normal daily HMC operations, OJT 
is often hurried, reducing its effectiveness, or neglected altogether. 
3) As orr substitutes for formal training, a negative compounding effect 
occurs. Details and requirements of the proper HMC procedures are lost over time and in 
translation during the OJT process. For example, the latest updates to IDCS and CHRIMP 
are not acquired through OJT as they would be through formal training courses. In formal 
courses, instructors are current on the latest issues and practices. 
All of the above mentioned tendencies lead to inefficiencies in HMCs. Expertise in 
identifying hazardous material compatabilities; proper ordering procedures; use of laser-
scanning equipment for inventories, receipts and issues; and operating the mcs program 
efficiently; tend to degrade over time without a periodic infusion of formal training. 
Therefore, the task is to identify a stable core of personnel to manage and operate HMCs 
for the long-term and provide them formal training to obtain a consistent, quality product. 
3. Establishing the HMC Management Core 
Chapter V identified four criteria that must be satisfied to establish an HMC 
management core for the long-term: 
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1) Assignment to HMCs must not adversely effect promotion opportunities. 
2) Personnel should be assigned for at least two year terms to develop 
corporate knowledge and expertise, allow for continuity, and realize a profitable return on 
investment in training. 
3) HMC manning should not be at the expense of the ship's other departments. 
4) Personnel who have previous inventory management experience or skills 
applicable to daily HMC operations should head the list of possible candidates. 
With these criteria in mind, a search through the list of Navy enlisted personnel 
ratings readily identifies one rating as being the best choice. That is the storekeeper (SK) 
rating. The storekeepers' function aboard a ship, and throughout their career, deals 
primarily in financial recording and reporting and inventory control. In fact, SKs manage 
the inventory for all shipboard spare parts and all associated storerooms. A logical 
conclusion is to consolidate the hazardous materials control function with the SK operation. 
At its inception, the shipboard CHRIMP gave supply officers the responsibility for 
establishing and operating HMCs. This is significant because all SKs are assigned to the 
supply department under the purview of the supply officer. Consequently, most supply 
officers, identifying the requirement for better inventory control in the HMC environment, 
chose SKs as HMC supervisors. This is evident in today' s HMC organizational structures. 
This recommendation directly addresses two of the disadvantages of the rotational 
pool. First, assigning SKs to HMCs does not deprive them of in rate job experience. 
Rather, it opens a new avenue for career development and promotion. Second, they have 
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already established inventory experience and expertise in shelf-life programs and various 
ordering, issuing and stowing functions. This gives them a solid foundation on which 
hazardous material nuances may be developed. 
The remaining two disadvantages of the traditional rotational pool concept may be 
addressed through changes in the billeting structure and Navy Enlisted Code (NEC) 
designation. The challenge is to ensure SK petty officers, who currently hold HMC 
supervisory positions aboard ships, receive formal training, and that the rotational pool 
personnel are replaced with additional SK billeting support. The former is achieved by 
establishing a 9595 HMC supervisor billet requirement for all ships, and requiring all 
personnel filling these billets to receive formal NEC training. The latter is achieved by 
changing the navy manpower planning document for shipboard SKs to add sufficient SK 
billets to man HMCs, depending on the size of the ship. In the case ofLSDs, one 
supervising SK petty officer, and one assistant junior seaman (E3) or below, each fully 
trained in 9595 and IDCS/CHRIMP, are sufficient to efficiently operate an HMC. 
The concept of adding billets contradicts today's "downsizing" philosophy. 
However, in the LSD example, actual HMC manning would be reduced from three, under 
the rotational pool system, to two, under the SK consolidation. This economy arises by 
reducing inefficiencies experienced under the rotational pool concept. Interruptions caused 
by frequent personnel turnovers are eliminated and, more importantly, a strong learning 
curve is realized through stable manning. This more than compensates for the 33% 
reduction in manpower. Similar manpower reductions are possible in other ship types, by 
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replacing a short-term untrained workforce with a longer-term expert core. 
Another argument supporting this concept recognizes that departments are 
undermanned when they provide personnel for HMC operations. They will now realize 
their full allotment of manpower, thereby improving overall ship effectiveness. Lastly, by 
reducing the number of personnel operating HMCs, and specifically identifying personnel to 
fill HMC billets, the core that requires training will be smaller and easily identifiable. This 
reduces training costs. The last section will present two options to fulfill the training 
requirements for personnel billeted to HMCs. 
4. Training HMC Personnel 
HMC training can be improved by combining the 9595 NEC and IDCS/CHRIMP 
curricula to form one comprehensive course that fully prepares HMC operators. Since 
training is strictly for SKs, course material associated with inventory management can be 
eliminated, such as, receipt, issue, ordering and stowage procedures and shelf-life programs. 
This will shorten the combined course from eight to possibly seven days. Additionally, this 
will likely eliminate the requirement for the contracted civilian instructors that are currently 
employed for HICS/CHRIMP training. This is particularly evident when comparing the 
1995 quotas of 420 students for the 9595 course and 288 for the HICS/CHR..Il\1P course, 
with the projected schooling requirements under the SK consolidation concept Exhibit 16. 
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ANNUAL TRAINING QUOTA REQUIREMENTS FOR THE SK 
CONSOLIDATION CONCEPT 
Ship t~pe Number of Number Qf Total number Total number of 
ships Qfthis SK's r~Quired ofSK's SK's reQuiring 
~ forHMC reQuiring training 
training (assuming 2 ~r tours) 
CV/CVN 13 6 78 
LHAILHD 8 4 32 
Others 189 2 378 
Total 488 /2 = 244 
Exhibit 16 
This number will be higher initially, to train existing HMC personnel. However, 
once established, this figure will actually decrease as more SKs complete training and 
therefore do not require training for subsequent HMC tours. Following this line of 
reasoning, the first training approach will now be discussed. 
a. Training Performed Enroute to HMC Billet 
Under this method, SKs are assigned HMC billets aboard ships either as a 
supervisor, for petty officers transferring from other commands, or as an assistant for E3s 
or below. Assistants probably come directly from SK "A" school to the ships. Since these 
assignments are made to fill NEC designated billets, BUPERS should control the training 
course quotas. As the controlling authority for personnel orders, they are able to manage 
the flow of personnel to courses and ensure afloat HMC billets are filled by qualified people. 
When personnel receive orders to an HMC billet, they can be first screened to see if they 
have already obtained the 9595 NEC and, if not, they are scheduled for the course enroute 
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to their new assignment. 
The advantages of this method are: 
1) Full visibility and control ofHMC billeting and course quotas at 
BUPERS. 
2) More efficient routing of personnel to school; then to their ultimate 
commands. 
3) Reduced training costs by matching HMC billets to course quotas, 
thereby ensuring only personnel assigned to valid HMC jobs obtain training. 
The disadvantages of the method are: 
1) An additional administrative burden for BUPERS. 
2) Travel, lodging and per diem costs will still be incurred to train 
personnel enroute to HMC billets. 
3) There is still a requirement for the separately established training 
installations to conduct the HMC training. 
An alternative to this method of training is to conduct all HMC training at 
the SK "A" schoolhouse. 
b. Training Performed at SK '~"School 
Alternatively, the consolidated 9595 NEC and lllCS/CHRIMP course could 
be integrated into the SK "A" specialty school. This school is attended after bootcamp by 
personnel entering the storekeeper pipeline. This school provides basic storekeeper training 
to those designated for careers in the storekeeper rating. In the initial stages of this 
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scenario, there will be a continued requirement for the current HMC training sites, like that 
in San Diego, predominantly for petty officer SKs that are HMC supervisors. However, 
this requirement will disipate when enough of those receiving HMC training in SK "A" 
school begin to reach petty officer to fill the available HMC billets. It will likely take five 
years before the satellite HMC sites can be closed. 
The advantages of this method are: 
I) Nearly all SKs will obtain the HMC training, and therefore be able to 
operate HMCs ashore or afloat. Eventually, there will be no shortage of qualified people. 
2) Training costs per person are likely to decrease once the satellite 
HMC training sites are closed. Existing SK "A" schoolhouse instructors can easily obtain 
the HMC expertise through training, and integrate an additional HMC module into the 
current curriculum. Consequently, the satellite instructors and the civilian contractors can 
be eliminated. 
3) Travel, lodging and perdiem costs to send personnel to HMC training 
will be eliminated once the program is in full operation and HMC training satellite sites are 
no longer required. 
4) The administrative burden for BUPERS is reduced because they do 
not have to control school quotas. In the long-term, BUPERS will not even be required to 
monitor HMC billets to ensure they are filled by qualified personnel; eventually nearly all 
SKs will be qualified. 
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The disadvantages of this method are: 
1) This method trains all SKs even though some may never work in 
HMCs. 
2) Initially, it will be more costly since training is provided both at SK 
"A" school and the satellite HMC training sites. 
C. SUMMARY AND SUGGESTION FOR FURTHER STUDY 
First, the various programs and initiatives presented in this study focused primarily 
on the shipboard hazardous materials environment. However, all concepts are equally 
applicable to shore commands. In fact, the difficulties imposed by afloat units, such as, 
deployments and space limitations, are not relevant at shore facilities. This makes transition 
significantly easier. 
Second, the numerous advantages and significant cost savings of the shop towel 
program need to be advertised to the users, and a strong program must be implemented to 
achieve these benefits immediately. Additionally, further research and negotiations should 
be conducted with shop towel companies to both provide an interim plan for towel usage 
overseas, and determine the feasibility of expanding the recycle program to provide full 
support in foreign countries. 
Third, a long-term strategy must be adopted to realize· CHRIMP' s full benefits. A 
structure that provides continuity in the HMC and career advantages to the operators is the 
first step. Additionally, providing those individuals requisite training will ensure expertise 
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is maintained and renewed periodically. This adds to operational efficiency. 
Finally, one subject surfaced as a particularly interesting topic for further study: The 
feasibility of integrating the lllCS inventory system with SNAP, the current shipboard stock 
inventory system. Specifically, one may research the costs to maintain and upgrade the 
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